Abstract. This paper proposes a new formulation of the Borda rule in order to deal with the problem of cloning manipulation. This new Borda voting specification will be named: Dynamic Borda Voting (DBV) and it satisfies Arrow's IIA condition. The calculations, propositions with proof and explanations are made to show the effectiveness of this method. From DBV, the paper presents a method to measure and quantify the magnitude of the shock due to change in irrelevant alternatives over a scale moving from 0 to 100.Keywords. Voting rules, Arrow IIA, Cloning manipulation.JEL. C60, D70, D80
Modifying single transferable vote (STV) by removing candidates according to their Borda scores crea...
We consider the problem of manipulating elections by cloning candidates. In our model, a manipulator...
International audienceIn an election contest, a losing candidate a can manipulate the election outco...
Abstract. This paper proposes a new formulation of the Borda rule in order to deal with the problem ...
This paper proposes a new formulation of the Borda rule in order to deal with the problem of cloning...
This paper deals with Borda count which is sincere voting system and originally proposed by French m...
Given that n voters report only the first r (1 ≤ r \u3c m) ranks of their linear preference rankings...
Dummett (1997) notes particular difficulties with single transferable vote (STV) and proposes an alt...
Borda Count is one of the earliest and most important voting rules. Going far beyond voting, we summ...
Using computer simulations based on three separate data generating processes, I estimate the fractio...
Voting is how we elect today’s voices, faces, and leaders in our country. It is argued to be a very ...
In this thesis, we discuss some existing and new results relating to computational aspects of voting...
Can neural networks learn to select an alternative based on a systematic aggregation of convicting i...
We study the problem of coalitional manipulation in elections using the unweighted Borda rule. We pr...
We consider the problem of manipulating elections via cloning candidates. In our model, a manipulato...
Modifying single transferable vote (STV) by removing candidates according to their Borda scores crea...
We consider the problem of manipulating elections by cloning candidates. In our model, a manipulator...
International audienceIn an election contest, a losing candidate a can manipulate the election outco...
Abstract. This paper proposes a new formulation of the Borda rule in order to deal with the problem ...
This paper proposes a new formulation of the Borda rule in order to deal with the problem of cloning...
This paper deals with Borda count which is sincere voting system and originally proposed by French m...
Given that n voters report only the first r (1 ≤ r \u3c m) ranks of their linear preference rankings...
Dummett (1997) notes particular difficulties with single transferable vote (STV) and proposes an alt...
Borda Count is one of the earliest and most important voting rules. Going far beyond voting, we summ...
Using computer simulations based on three separate data generating processes, I estimate the fractio...
Voting is how we elect today’s voices, faces, and leaders in our country. It is argued to be a very ...
In this thesis, we discuss some existing and new results relating to computational aspects of voting...
Can neural networks learn to select an alternative based on a systematic aggregation of convicting i...
We study the problem of coalitional manipulation in elections using the unweighted Borda rule. We pr...
We consider the problem of manipulating elections via cloning candidates. In our model, a manipulato...
Modifying single transferable vote (STV) by removing candidates according to their Borda scores crea...
We consider the problem of manipulating elections by cloning candidates. In our model, a manipulator...
International audienceIn an election contest, a losing candidate a can manipulate the election outco...