Professor Tomain assails the myths holding that contract law is either complete and unitary or hopelessly indeterminate. He contends that a distinction must be made between market situations, which require a more formal analysis, and nonmarket transactions to which a more particularized analysis should be applied. Making the market/nonmarket distinction permits flexibility of methodology and considerations of economics, politics, and morals as appropriate, without forcing the conclusion that contracts analysis is totally without structure. Professor Tomain advocates application of reflective doctrinal analysis which tests the sufficiency of a rule of law and reforms the rule if it is not supported by sound policies. The analysis should rela...
Many people have false beliefs about contract doctrine. That pervasive phenomenon has profound prac...
To demonstrate the need for a unified instrumental framework for deciding gaps and implying liabilit...
There is little doubt that historically the \u27reasonable foreseeability\u27 criterion in Hadley v....
Professor Tomain assails the myths holding that contract law is either complete and unitary or hopel...
In the realm of contractual remedies, there are two axioms upon which legal scholars and jurists hav...
The law of contracts is complex but remarkably stable. What we lack is a widely accepted interpretat...
The law of contracts is complex but remarkably stable. What we lack is a widely accepted interpretat...
Those of us who study contracts tend to forget that most people keep the promises they make. Contrac...
The common law practice of refusing to enforce contractual penalties has long mystified law and econ...
Diligent first year law students study contract law with a passion previously reserved for romantic ...
The argument here amplifies the contract literature with respect to basic contract theory and its do...
This paper, which will appear as a chapter in the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics (A.M. Po...
A central question of contract law remains: when should the law supply a term not expressly agreed t...
This article is a somewhat abridged version of the fifth annual Foulston-Siefkin Lecture which Profe...
An old and cardinal rule of contract law requires that expectancy damages for breach of contract put...
Many people have false beliefs about contract doctrine. That pervasive phenomenon has profound prac...
To demonstrate the need for a unified instrumental framework for deciding gaps and implying liabilit...
There is little doubt that historically the \u27reasonable foreseeability\u27 criterion in Hadley v....
Professor Tomain assails the myths holding that contract law is either complete and unitary or hopel...
In the realm of contractual remedies, there are two axioms upon which legal scholars and jurists hav...
The law of contracts is complex but remarkably stable. What we lack is a widely accepted interpretat...
The law of contracts is complex but remarkably stable. What we lack is a widely accepted interpretat...
Those of us who study contracts tend to forget that most people keep the promises they make. Contrac...
The common law practice of refusing to enforce contractual penalties has long mystified law and econ...
Diligent first year law students study contract law with a passion previously reserved for romantic ...
The argument here amplifies the contract literature with respect to basic contract theory and its do...
This paper, which will appear as a chapter in the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics (A.M. Po...
A central question of contract law remains: when should the law supply a term not expressly agreed t...
This article is a somewhat abridged version of the fifth annual Foulston-Siefkin Lecture which Profe...
An old and cardinal rule of contract law requires that expectancy damages for breach of contract put...
Many people have false beliefs about contract doctrine. That pervasive phenomenon has profound prac...
To demonstrate the need for a unified instrumental framework for deciding gaps and implying liabilit...
There is little doubt that historically the \u27reasonable foreseeability\u27 criterion in Hadley v....