Taking Our Actual Constitution Seriously

In this review, by concentrating on the general aim of Dworkin\u27s book, I hope to contribute to the discussion this book is sure to generate. What does the moral reading of our Constitution amount to, and what alternative do we have to endorsing such a reading? I ask these questions from what I would call a jurisprudentialperspective. For, while I do teach Jurisprudence, I do not teach Constitutional Law, other than some constitutional law themes that find their way into my Property and Wills & Trusts courses. Accordingly, I am not well placed to review the details orthe nuances of developments after Roe v. Wade,2 or the progeny spawned by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3 two cases that dominate Parts I and II, respectively, of the book. But this personal limitation leaves me room perhaps for a more considered review of Dworkin\u27s main thrust in this book, which is directed toward makinghis view of the Constitution credible, or palatable, to his reader. Dworkin\u27s theory of how to read the Constitution is, after all, central to his argument