Conceptions of Legal Theory: A Response to Ronald Dworkin

The editors have kindly invited Professor Sunstein and me to comment on Ronald Dworkin\u27s article In Praise of Theory.\u27 The article is critical of what Dworkin calls the Chicago School of anti-theorists, 2 to which he has consigned both Sunstein and me despite the palpable differences between our views. I do not want to paper over those differences, but I do want to point out that Dworkin has committed the identical error in his criticisms of both of us, as well as mischaracterizing our views. That error is to announce a parochial definition of theory, then define anyone who does not subscribe to it as an anti-theorist. I shall explain this error and argue that it deforms Dworkin\u27s analysis of my own conception of theory and that his own conception is inadequate as a guide for judges or others engaged in practical legal tasks