Regulators require banks to maintain capital above a certain level in order to correct the incentives to make excessively risky loans. However, it has never been clear how regulators determine how high or low the minimum capital–asset ratio should be. An examination of US regulators’ justifications for five regulations is-sued over more than thirty years reveals that regulators have never performed a serious economic analysis that would justify the levels that they have chosen. In-stead, regulators appear to have followed a practice of incremental change de-signed to weed out a handful of outlier banks. This approach resulted in signifi-cant regulatory failures leading up to the financial crisis of 2007–2008
In order to promote financial stability, regulatory authorities pay a lot of attention in setting mi...
This paper considers the implementation challenges facing the Basel Committee's new proposals on ban...
This article considers two fundamental issues in the design of bank capital regulation—the choice of...
Minimum capital regulations play a central role in banking regulation. Regulators require banks to m...
Regulators require banks to maintain capital above a certain level in order to correct the incentive...
Banks must maintain minimum capital levels, but a regulated balance sheet implies profit suboptimiza...
This chapter aims to provide a concise overview of the capital adequacy regulation, importance of th...
This paper provides evidence that the overcapitalized banks are much more sensitive to fundamental f...
The orthodox assumption in the banking literature is that capital requirements are a binding constra...
The subject of bank capital adequacy has been attracting attention for a long time. But recently, th...
Improving commercial bank capital requirements has been a top priority on the regulatory agenda sinc...
Empirical evidence suggests that banks hold capital in excess of regulatory minimums. This did not p...
The capital adequacy requirements for banks, enshrined in international banking regulations, are bas...
To calculate regulatory capital ratios, banks have to apply adjustments to book equity. These regula...
This study proposes a model that describes banks' decisions about their capital structures and analy...
In order to promote financial stability, regulatory authorities pay a lot of attention in setting mi...
This paper considers the implementation challenges facing the Basel Committee's new proposals on ban...
This article considers two fundamental issues in the design of bank capital regulation—the choice of...
Minimum capital regulations play a central role in banking regulation. Regulators require banks to m...
Regulators require banks to maintain capital above a certain level in order to correct the incentive...
Banks must maintain minimum capital levels, but a regulated balance sheet implies profit suboptimiza...
This chapter aims to provide a concise overview of the capital adequacy regulation, importance of th...
This paper provides evidence that the overcapitalized banks are much more sensitive to fundamental f...
The orthodox assumption in the banking literature is that capital requirements are a binding constra...
The subject of bank capital adequacy has been attracting attention for a long time. But recently, th...
Improving commercial bank capital requirements has been a top priority on the regulatory agenda sinc...
Empirical evidence suggests that banks hold capital in excess of regulatory minimums. This did not p...
The capital adequacy requirements for banks, enshrined in international banking regulations, are bas...
To calculate regulatory capital ratios, banks have to apply adjustments to book equity. These regula...
This study proposes a model that describes banks' decisions about their capital structures and analy...
In order to promote financial stability, regulatory authorities pay a lot of attention in setting mi...
This paper considers the implementation challenges facing the Basel Committee's new proposals on ban...
This article considers two fundamental issues in the design of bank capital regulation—the choice of...