The Neuroethical Case Against Cognitive Memory Manipulation

An increasingly blurred understanding of the moral significance of accurate and authentic memory reconsolidation for an adequate apprehension of self, other, and community suggests a critical need to explore the inter-relationships shared between autobiographical memory, emotional rationality, and narrative identity in light of the contemporary possibilities of neurocognitive memory manipulation, particularly as it bears on ethical decision making. Grounding its thesis in four evidential effects – namely, (i) neurocognitive memory manipulation disintegrates autobiographical memory, (ii) the disintegration of autobiographical memory degenerates emotional rationality, (iii) the degeneration of emotional rationality decays narrative identity, and (iv) the decay of narrative identity disables one to seek, identify, and act on the good – the dissertation argues that neurocognitive memory manipulation cannot be justified as a morally licit biomedical practice insofar as it disables one to seek, identify, and act on the good