Hvorfor Habermas’ vision for et demokratisk EU ikke kan stå alene

This article discusses Habermas’ vision of a supranational yet democratic EU. The article engages in a discussion of what I take to be two problematic elements of Habermas’ model of EU democracy. Firstly, it discusses the European Parliament as a representative channel, which should, according to Habermas, be strengthened. I here raise the concern that Habermas is not sufficiently sensitive to the tension between the recognition of a weak public and the desire for a strong Parliament. Secondly, I discuss whether executive federalism can also be circumvented by strengthening not just the representation of the European citizens, but also by strengthening parliamentarian representation of the European peoples. Based on these two critiques I end up arguing that Habermas’ vision for EU democracy would benefit from drawing inspiration from the demoicracy literature’s focus on alternative channels of representation