The Effect of the Norm of Group Interest in Response to Leader Dissent

I examine the influence of a leader\u27s dissenting behavior in an intergroup task on a group member\u27s evaluation of the leader\u27s performance. In the proposed study, group members will participate in a Prisoner\u27s Dilemma Game (PDG). False feedback will create a cooperative group decision and then group members will be informed of the leader\u27s decision to conform to or dissent from the group\u27s decision. The leader\u27s decision will be paired with a high payout or low payout group outcome. I investigate predictions based on Social Identity Theory (SIT), Realistic Group Conflict Theory (RGCT), and Norm of Group Interest (NGI). NGI predicts individual variations in outcome-based evaluations of the leader, RGCT predicts high payouts should be associated with high evaluations of the leader. Lastly, SIT predicts a leader\u27s dissent should result in lower evaluations of the leader from low identifying members regardless of outcome. Results will highlight each models\u27 fit to dissent and leadership situations within an intergroup context.https://ecommons.udayton.edu/stander_posters/2480/thumbnail.jp