Jani Raerinne and Lindley Darden argue that causal claims are not sufficiently explanatory, and causal talk should be replaced with mechanistic talk. I examine several examples from ecological research, two of which rely on causal models and structural equation modeling, to show that the assertions of Raerinne and of Darden have to be reconsidered
The present paper critically examines the main claims of the new mechanist account of explanation de...
Conceptions of mechanisms due to Glennan (1996; 2002), Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000), Bechtel ...
My dissertation examines common types of causal complexity in the biological sciences, the challenge...
James Woodward offers a conception of explanation and mechanism in terms of interventionist counterf...
There is a recent literature in philosophy that has developed a taxonomy of scientific explanations ...
This article addresses the contributions of the literature on the new mechanistic philosophy of scie...
This paper critiques the new mechanistic explanatory program on grounds that, even when applied to t...
Causal accounts of scientific explanation are currently broadly accepted (though not universally so)...
In the last two decades few topics in philosophy of science have received as much attention as mecha...
The search for mechanisms and their description of explanatory and predictive purposes has been, and...
According to mainstream philosophical views causal explanation in biology and neuroscience is mechan...
Microcosm studies of ecological processes have been criticized for being unrealistic. However, since...
In this BA dissertation, I deploy examples of non-causal explanations of physical phenomena as evide...
In this essay a dialogue is established between the main epistemological theories about causality th...
In light of recent criticisms by Woodward (2017) and Rescorla (2018), we examine the relationship be...
The present paper critically examines the main claims of the new mechanist account of explanation de...
Conceptions of mechanisms due to Glennan (1996; 2002), Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000), Bechtel ...
My dissertation examines common types of causal complexity in the biological sciences, the challenge...
James Woodward offers a conception of explanation and mechanism in terms of interventionist counterf...
There is a recent literature in philosophy that has developed a taxonomy of scientific explanations ...
This article addresses the contributions of the literature on the new mechanistic philosophy of scie...
This paper critiques the new mechanistic explanatory program on grounds that, even when applied to t...
Causal accounts of scientific explanation are currently broadly accepted (though not universally so)...
In the last two decades few topics in philosophy of science have received as much attention as mecha...
The search for mechanisms and their description of explanatory and predictive purposes has been, and...
According to mainstream philosophical views causal explanation in biology and neuroscience is mechan...
Microcosm studies of ecological processes have been criticized for being unrealistic. However, since...
In this BA dissertation, I deploy examples of non-causal explanations of physical phenomena as evide...
In this essay a dialogue is established between the main epistemological theories about causality th...
In light of recent criticisms by Woodward (2017) and Rescorla (2018), we examine the relationship be...
The present paper critically examines the main claims of the new mechanist account of explanation de...
Conceptions of mechanisms due to Glennan (1996; 2002), Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000), Bechtel ...
My dissertation examines common types of causal complexity in the biological sciences, the challenge...