Intuition and its proper uses

What is intuition? Is it nothing but a nagging conviction in certain beliefs? Is it the same thing as common sense? When, if ever, is intuition a legitimate epistemological tool? Is the use of intuition in philosophical inquiry not just legitimate, but also inevitable? The aim of the present research project is to answer these and related questions. This research project will prove important due to the regularity with which intuitions are evoked in philosophical discourse, and the judgment errors that can result from a misunderstanding of the proper scope of these intuitions. In section (1), I define and explain intuition. In section (2), I demonstrate that intuition is relevantly similar to perception, thereby offering the defense that intuition is epistemologically adequate to the same extant that perception is epistemologically adequate. In section (3), I attempt to determine specifically when intuition tends to be untrustworthy and when it should beavoided in philosophical argumentation