In this paper we show how protocol insecurity problems expressed in a multi-set rewriting formalism can be automatically translated into logic programming problems. The proposed translation paves the way to the construction of model-checkers for security protocols based on state-of-the-art solvers for logic programs. We have assessed the effectiveness of the approach by running the proposed reduction against a selection of insecurity problems drawn from the Clark & Jacob library of security protocols: by running state-of-the-art solvers against the resulting logic programming problems most of the (known) attacks on the considered protocols are found in a few seconds
Abstract. A truly secure protocol is one which never violates its se-curity requirements, no matter ...
The security problem for protocols with an unbounded number of sessios is in general undecidable. Ho...
We present a technique for cryptographic protocol verification, based on an intermediate representat...
Abstract. In this paper we show how protocol insecurity problems expressed in a multi-set rewriting ...
Abstract. This thesis is about the application of automated reasoning techniques to the formal analy...
Abstract. This thesis is about the application of auto-mated reasoning techniques to the formal anal...
International audienceSecurity protocols are distributed programs that aim at securing communication...
We present a model checking technique for security protocols based on a reduction to propositional l...
Security protocol analysis has been a major research topic in information security and recognised to...
International audienceSecurity protocols are the small distributed programs which are omnipresent in...
AbstractWe present CASRUL, a compiler for cryptographic protocols specifications. Its purpose is to ...
We define a sequent calculus to formally specify, simulate, debug and verify security protocols. In ...
Automated formal verification of security protocols has been mostly focused on analyzing high-level ...
In this paper we define a sequent calculus to formally specify, simulate, debug and verify security ...
A security protocol is a distributed program that might be executed on a network controlled by an ad...
Abstract. A truly secure protocol is one which never violates its se-curity requirements, no matter ...
The security problem for protocols with an unbounded number of sessios is in general undecidable. Ho...
We present a technique for cryptographic protocol verification, based on an intermediate representat...
Abstract. In this paper we show how protocol insecurity problems expressed in a multi-set rewriting ...
Abstract. This thesis is about the application of automated reasoning techniques to the formal analy...
Abstract. This thesis is about the application of auto-mated reasoning techniques to the formal anal...
International audienceSecurity protocols are distributed programs that aim at securing communication...
We present a model checking technique for security protocols based on a reduction to propositional l...
Security protocol analysis has been a major research topic in information security and recognised to...
International audienceSecurity protocols are the small distributed programs which are omnipresent in...
AbstractWe present CASRUL, a compiler for cryptographic protocols specifications. Its purpose is to ...
We define a sequent calculus to formally specify, simulate, debug and verify security protocols. In ...
Automated formal verification of security protocols has been mostly focused on analyzing high-level ...
In this paper we define a sequent calculus to formally specify, simulate, debug and verify security ...
A security protocol is a distributed program that might be executed on a network controlled by an ad...
Abstract. A truly secure protocol is one which never violates its se-curity requirements, no matter ...
The security problem for protocols with an unbounded number of sessios is in general undecidable. Ho...
We present a technique for cryptographic protocol verification, based on an intermediate representat...