Phenomenology and Ontology

In Section 11 of Lecture-Course, History of the Concept of Time, Martin Heidegger states that “Husserl’s primary question is simply not concerned with the character of the being of consciousness. Rather, he is guided by the following concern: How can consciousness become the possible object of an absolute science? The primary concern which guides him is the idea of an absolute science. This idea… is the idea which has occupied modern philosophy ever since Descartes. The elaboration of pure consciousness as the thematic field of phenomenology is not derived phenomenologically by going back to the matters themselves but by going back to a traditional idea of philosophy.” (History 147) In this presentation, I will discuss Heidegger’s critique of phenomenology, how, from this critique, Heidegger connects Ontology and Phenomenology through the revelation that “Ontology and Phenomenology are not two different disciplines which among others belong to philosophy. Both terms characterize Philosophy itself, its object and procedure. Philosophy is universal Phenomenological ontology” (Being and Time 38) Then I will discuss how this revelation uncovers that Phenomenology’s “essential character does not consist in its actuality as a philosophical ‘movement.’ Higher than actuality stands possibility. We can understand phenomenology solely by seizing upon it as a possibility.” (Being and Time 39