OPERATIONS THE HERALD OF ASIA LIBRARY OF CONTEMPORARY HISTORY No. 5 (Revised Edition) )> 0 -l 0 5 0 ~ w-,... THE HERALD PRESS, C)-~ ~ HIBIYA PARK. TOKYO CD FURTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS FOREWORD The volume now presented to the public · is an attempt to chronicle briefly and accurately the course of military operations in Manchuria subse-quently to what happened immediately after the outbreak of September 18, 1931, (vide the Herald of Asia Library of Contemporary History. No. 4), to which is added a short reference to the minor trouble at Tientsin. The narrative is brought down to the first week of February, 1932, it being based on official data given out so far. In some remote corners of Manchuria small parties of troops led by the adherents of the dispossessed warlords are still at large and give some trouble. But it is generally believed that the entry of the Japanese army into Harbin marks the termination of the military stage in the history of Manchurian rebirth. The epoch just ushered in is marked by the birth of a new and independent state. This seems the logical outcome of the peculiar situation resulting from China's miserable failure to function as an efficient and responsible political entity. To let Chang Hsueh-liang return to Mukden would be to repeat the same disastrous experience. And there is no leader who could be trusted to avoid Chang's mistakes. The emergence of the independ-ent Republic of Manchuria, therefore, comes very ii opportune. It may or may not prove a success, but it is at least an experiment worth trying. In the meantime, it may be worthwhile to make it clear that Japan, in so far as it lies in her power, will not countenance any policy on the part of the new Republic of Manchuria contrary to her traditional policy of the open door and equal opportunity, and there is every reason to believe that the Chinese and Manchurian leaders in the new Government of Manchuria will remain true to that policy. Time, however, is not yet ripe for further reference to the new Manchurian state. It is only just born, and it will be some time yet before it will actually begin to function. What is most satisfactory in connection with the present situation, is the splendid unanimity of purpose with which the whole nation has responded to the call for service and sacrifice in the interest of the country. Indeed, our people of all classes have never been more thoroughly united than they are now. This is the result in part of the tradi· tiona! spirit of loyalty and patriotism, but it is also the result of a strong and widespread recognition by our people of the enormous importance of the stake Japan has in Manchuria. Practically every body in Japan realizes how closely and vitally our welfare and strength is bound up with the assurance of stable peace in Manchuria. How strongly the nation has rallied round the Army in connection with the Manchurian affair, may be guaged by the amount of voluntary iii contributions sent in to the War Office for consol· ing the men at the front. It had amounted by February 10, 1932, to ¥2,100,000, while the consolation bags received by the same date had totalled 1,300,000. At the time of our war with Russia, the respective figures were ¥1,260,000 and 590,000. These contri-butions came from all parts 9f the country and all sorts of people. The same spirit has also found expression in prayers offered at shrines and temples for the prosperity of the Imperial House. The same observation applies also to the public enthu· siasm in sending Qff troops to the front or in paying respects to the ashes of the officers and men killed in action, when they are sent home. The enthusiasm now shown in these respects compare favourably with what was noticed during the Russian war. MoTOSADA ZUMOTO Tokyo, March, 1932. CONTENTS PAGE L BATTLE OF THE NONNI 1 II. BATTLE OF ANGANGCHI • 12 Jti: TIENTSIN INCIDENT • 28 IV. CHINCHOW EPISODE • 32 v. HARBIN CAMPAIGN 41 VI. JAPANESE CASUALTIES. 59 I. BATTLE OF THE NONNI 1. Up to Outbreak of Hostilities The first important conflict between the Japanese and Chinese forces in Manchuria after the fightings immediately following the now historic outbreak on the night of September 18, 1931, took place on the Nonni in North Manchuria at the beginning of November. It was occasioned by an act of treachery on the part of a detachment of the Heilungkiang army stationed on the northern side of the river, which, contrary to previous understanding, suddenly opened fire upon a small party of Japanese troops that had been sent there for the protection of the repairs then proceeding on the bridges. It may be recalled that shortly after the Mukden incident there began a trouble between the Heilung· kiang army under General Ma Chan-shan and the army at Taonan under General Chang Hai·peng. Consequently much apprehension was generally entertained as to the safety of the Taonan·Angangchi railway. General Chang was then making prepara· tions for proceeding to Tsitsihar by that railway at the head of his army, with a view to seizing the provincial government of Heilungkiang. On the other hand General Ma, by order of General Wan Pu-lin, concentrated his troops at Tsitsihar to 2 frustrate General Chang's northward expedition. There is reason to believe that the Heilungkiang army was in secret communication with the Soviet army over the border, trying to secure assistance in the form of arms and ammunition. By the middle of October, General Chang's army had commenced its northward march by the Taonan· Angangchi railway. With its main body stationed at Wumiaotze (north of Tailai), a part of the army advanced to the neighbourhood of the Nonni, when its further progress was stopped by the advance guard of the Heilungkiang army stationed on the opposite bank of the river with some field pieces. Moreover, the railway bridges had been damaged by General Ma's army on the 15th or 16th of October. Under the circumstances General Chang had for the moment to give up any hope of immediate march upon Tsitsihar, and so he retreated with the main body of his army to the neighbourhood of Taoan. To make the story clear, it must be noted that the Taonan-Angangchi railway was built by the South Manchuria Railway under contract with the Mukden Government. Starting work in March, 1925, it was turned over to that Government in December, 1926, it being opened to public traffic in March, 1927. The amount of money advanced by the South Manchuria Railway Company was ¥17,000,000, of which ¥13,000,000 was the cost of construction and ¥4,000,000 the price of the rolling stock and other forms of equipment. As for the repayment of this money, it was arranged 3 (1) That the money required for the construction of the railway and its equipment should be paid by the Mukden Government immediately upon the delivery of the railway, and (2) That in case such payment is not effected within six months after the delivery of the railway, a special agreement shall be made in the form of a loan contract at 9 percent annual interest. But the Mukden Government failed to carry out any of these terms, even refusing to implement its obligation as originally agreed upon. Its indebtedness to the South Manchuria Railway Company on this score amounted by the end of June, 1931, to ¥26,000,000, principal and interest together. Under the circumstances, this railway may justly be regarded as property of the South Manchuria Railway Company, forming one of its feeder lines. In any case it forms a sufficiently valuable Japanese interest to be protected against damage by any body, Chinese or otherwise. Moreover, the present stoppage of traffic over this railway happened to be at a season when the farm products of North Manchuria were being shipped southward, thus causing no small loss to the railways concerned and also to the farmers in the wide range of territory tapped by those lines. The Taonan-Angangchi railway authorities and the South Manchuria Railway Company, consequent-ly, made combined efforts, through our diplomati~ and military channels, to get the damage to the railway bridges over the Nonni repaired by some 4 responsible Chinese authorities. These efforts, however, failed to bear any fruit, so it only remained for us to undertake ourselves the neces-sary repairs under the protection of our troops. It may be interesting to recapitulate some of the facts connected with the fruitless attempts made to get the repairs made by some Chinese authorities : (1) On October 12, a Japanese member of the staff of the Taonan-Angangchi railway, together with three Chinese colleagues, went to the Nanni bridges to make an inspection of the damage, but they were not permitted to carry out their mission, as a detachment of some 80 Heilungkiang troops brushed aside their identification papers and forced them to turn back at the point of their machine guns. Their train was actually fired upon with field pieces. (2) On October 21, a Japanese plane reconnoitred along the Taonan-Angangchi railway as far as the Nanni bridges, where it was fired upon by the Heilungkiang troops stationed on the north side of the river. The matter was at once taken up by our military authorities with the Heilungkiang Government through Consul Shimizu at Tsitsihar. (3) On October 23, Consul Shimizu opened negotia· tions with the local Chinese authorities concerning the repa:irs to the damaged railway bridges. The Chinese authorities replied that, as they would undertake the necessary repairs, the Japanese should never interfere with the railway. They, however, refused to say when the repairs would be made. 5 They further declared that, in case the Japanese attempted to undertake repairs, the Heilungkiang army wouid prevent it by force. (4) After repeated negotiations, General MaChan-shan finally set October 30 as the date for starting repair work. But as a matter of fact, he tried not only to postpone the work but to intimidate us by saying that behind him there was a Soviet army of 50,000 men. Being now thoroughly assured that the Chinese authorities had no intention of undertaking the required repair work on the bridges over the Nonni, the Directors of the Taonan-Angangchi railway and the South Manchuria Railway Company decided to start the repair work themselves on November 4, and applied to the headquarters of the Kwantung Army for adequate military protection. This deci-sion on their part was necessary in view of the fact that the river was due to be frozen very soon, in which case proper repairs would be impossible. As for the military protection, its necessity was obvious from the proved temper and past conduct of the Heilungkiang army and the bandits who infested the neighbourhood. The Kwantung Army, thereupon, decided to accept the application for protection, and issued orders for the despatch of a . detachment to the Nonni on November 2. At the same time an ' identical communication was sent to both the Heilungkiang army and General Chang Hai-peng's army, calling their attention to the following points : 6 (1) That the Japanese army observes strict neutrality as to the civil strife between the two Chinese armies. (2) That, in order to prevent unforeseen complica-tions, both the Chinese armies should retire to a distance of 10 kilometres from the nearest bridge. (3) That for the time being the bridges may not be used by either army for military purposes. (4) In case of any interference with the actions of the Japanese army or any hostile action against it, necessary and efficient measures of self-protection will be taken against the offending army, whichever it may be. It should be stated that the Nonni at this point has a wide river-bed, measuring about 8 kilometres from one side to the other. It is spanned by five separate bridges, of which the three nearest the southern (i.e. the right) bank were damaged. The railway station at the southern bank is called Kiangchiao, and that on the north bank Tahsing. In order to afford efficient protection to the repair party, it was evident that our detachment should occupy Tahsing on the .north side. But a body of Heilungkiang troops was in occupation of that neighbourhood. So the Japanese army requested it to move 10 kilometres further north. The Japanese detachment detailed for the protec· tion of the repair party consisted of a battalion of infantry (three companies), with a battalion of artillery (two companies) and a company of en· gineers, under the command of Colonel Hamamoto. 7 It was called the Nonni Detachment, and its transportation was commenced on November 2. The troops under General Chang, in compliance with our request, retreated to the south of Wumiaotze. But the Heilungkiang forces, so far from retreating from their positions, were busily engaged in warlike preparations, showing a pro-vokingly hostile attitude toward our detachment. For instance, when a scouting party proceeded on November 2 as far as the ·second bridge to inspect the actual state of the damage done, it was heavily fired upon by the Heilungkiang troops. Again on the morning of November 3 our scouting party despatched on a similar errand found the third bridge in occupation of Heilungkiang troops with three machine guns which at once opened fire upon it, so that it had to retreat without accomplishing its object. The disposition of the Heilungkiang army in the neighbourhood of Angangchi on the night of November 4, is shown on Chart 1. 2. Progress of Hostilities 1. November 4. In compliance with an earnest request of the Heilungkiang army, a party of Japanese authorities, ,. including Consul Shimizu and Major Hayashi, came down to the Nonni from Tsitsihar, arriving at Kiangchao at 8.30 a.m. They were accompanied 8 by General Shih, Chief of Staff to the Heilungkiang army, and a few other Chinese officials. From there General Shih notified the commander of the Japanese Nanni detachment to the effect that the Heilungkiang army had no hostile intention toward the Japanese forces. He left there almost immediately afterward. Thereupon, the Japanese detachment sent a small party (a company) to Tahsing with two national flags, one large and the other small. When it reached a point about 1,000 metres south of Tahsing at about 1.30 in the afternoon, it was suddenly and unexpectedly sub-jected to a heavy fire from the Heilungkiang troops stationed on the north side of the Nanni, sustaining 15 casualties. It had to fall back to the bridge-head, where it joined the engineer company and waited for the arrival of the main body of the detachment. It was shortly after two that the detachment joined the advance party at the bridge-head, where it found in front a wide strech of marshy land very difficult of negotiation. To add to its worry, our artillery fire did not reach the enemy's position. A frontal attack being under the circumstances out of the question, the advance party was ordered to outflank the enemy on his left side. It was thus decided to wait for developments. In the meantime our airplanes bombed the enemy's position, doing considerable amount of damage. But the enemy still continued to bombard our position. By 4.30, however, one of our mountain pieces was with great difficulty brought up to the 9 back of our first line. It at once went into action and succeeded in silencing the enemy's artillery. All this while, the advance party under a heavy fire from the enemy struggled through the marshy land and succeeded in occupying an elevated position about 3 kilometres north-east of Tahsing. But the battle had not shown noticeable development when night descended upon the scene. The Commander of the Kwantung Army, acting upon the report submitted by a staff officer who bad been sent to observe the operations, issued an order tonight for the despatch of another battalion of infantry to reinforce the Nonni detachment. 2. November 5. The main body of our detachment commenced operations at four in the morning, opened artillery fire at six and started a forward offensive movement shortly after seven. The Chinese occupying a strong position offered a stout resistance, and owing also to the topographical disadvantage, the progress of the engagement was slow. Our troops, however, succeeded in wresting from the enemy an important point about one and a half kilometres east of Tahsing Station at about half past eight. At ten our detachment occupied the enemy's first line of defence. The enemy retreated seven or eight hundred metres back to his second line of defence where he continued to offer a strong resistance. Our artillery experienced great difficulty ; - 10 -in moving the guns, so that only three field and three mountain pieces were brought into action by ten o'clock. The result was that it degenerated into a drawn engagement. Not only that, at about three in the afternoon a superior force of the enemy assumed an offensive against the right back of our detachment, inflicting a heavy damage upon it. In consequence, our detachment was forced to reform part of its fighting line, and darkness fell upon it still engaged in a difficult fight. In the morning the staff officer despatched from the headquarters had reported to the Commander that the Heilungkiang army did not seem inclined to retire, but that . it seemed intent upon making a determined resistance. So the Commander ordered two more infantry battalions and three artillery companies to hasten to the support of the detach-ment. At 7.30 the first reinforcement, Nagura battalion, arrived and at once took up position. But it hardly sufficed to tum the scale decisively in our favour, so that the detachment passed a most anxious night impatiently waiting for the arrival of the rest of the reinforcements. 3. November 6. Today the command of the detachment was taken over by Major-General Hasebe who had come with the reinforcements. With the arrival of successive units of the reinforcements, the fight assumed a favourable turn. The enemy's units in the rear - 11 -began to retire northward from about eight in the morning, while a party of cavalry which had been harassing us from early morning withdrew in a northerly and north-easterly direction. The enemy's first line still continued to put up a stout fight, and it was only when an important position was captured by Nagura battalion under artillery support that the enemy began to falter, so that our detach-ment succeeded in occupying the enemy's position a little after ten o'clock. At noon our detachment concentrated its strength to the east of Tahsing and took up a suitable position for the protection of the party engaged in repairing the bridges. The enemy's infantry which fought in the vicinity of Tahsing was not less than 2,000 strong. In addition, a large body of cavalry also took part in the fight. The main body of the retreating enemy halted in the neighbourhood of Angangchi, while a small portion continued the retreat to Tsitsihar. 4. Casualties. I. On our side : Killed-1 officer; 35 n.c.o. and men Wounded-7 officers; 15 n.c.o. and 122 men Total casualties-180 Aeroplanes damaged-3 II. The enemy left 200 dead, of whom two were Russians. , II. BATTLE OF ANGANGCHI 1. Ma's Diplomatic Manoeuvring When the Heilungkiang army was defeated at the Nonni on November 6, our detachment which had been joined by the second reinforcements and which was about to be joined by a third party of reinforce-ments, could have easily launched a strong attack upon the retreating enemy, thereby inflicting such a damage upon him as would probably have fatally crippled him. And our men in the first line were eager to take such a course. But their commander wisely refrained from it for fear lest it might lead to an undesirable complication of the situation contrary to the principle of peace underlying the national policy of Japan. But unfortunately the praiseworthy forbearance shown by our commander was interpreted by General Ma Chan-shan as a sign of weakness. He accordingly halted his retreating army at a point south of Angangchi only a few kilometres from the Nonni, and constructed a strong position there. Moreover, he summoned there reinforcements from Heiho, Harbin and Manchuli. At the same time he received telegraphic instructions from Chang Hsueh-liang at Peiping, ordering him to utilize convenient opportunity for exterminating the Japanese army. - 13 -He was also idolized by his fellow countrymen as a national hero. The result was that General Ma's men were highly elated and longed for further opportunity for distinguishing themselves. They intrigued to create disturbances in the rear of our detachment and also to injure again the bridges over the Nonni. It was thus increasingly evident that another collision between the Japanese and Chinese forces was inevitable in that part of Manchuria. But the Kwantung army headquarters did not give up the hope of arriving at an amicable under-standing with General Ma. So it caused its repre-sentative at Tsitsihar, Major Hayashi, to take the matter up with General Ma at that town. Several interviews took place between them on November 3 and thereafter, when the treacherous conduct on the part of Ma at the Nonni and Tahsing was pointed out to him, and he was urged to call his troops back to Tsitsihar, at the same time guaran-tying the safety of the Taonan-Angangchi railway. But General Ma did not respond to these overtures in a favourable manner or in a spirit of sincerity. On the contrary he seemed to be only anxious to push forward his hostile preparations. Under these circumstances it was clear that, unless something was done to ease the situation, a dangerous clash would become unavoidable between the Japanese and Chinese armies. So the Kwan- ' tung army headquarters, with a view to placing the Heilungkiang army and our Nonni detachment a~ a safe distance from each other, made the following - 14 -fair and moderate proposal to the Chinese side on November 14: (1) Ma Chan-shan should withdraw to Tsitsihar and north of it, at the same time causing the troops concentrated at Tsitsihar and the neighbourhood of Angangchi in connection with the present complica-tion to return to their original positions. (2) Ma Chan-shan should not send his troops south of the Chinese Eastern Railway. (3) The Taonan-Angangchi railway will be operated by the administrative bureau of that line, and Ma Chan-shan should in no way interfere with its operation. In case of such interference, the Imperial army will at once take necessary and efficient measures. (4) Ma Chan-shan should carry out the conditions mehtioned above within ten days from November 15. (5) The Nonni detachment of the Japanese army, after satisfying itself as to the carrying out of the aforementioned conditions, will at once retire to the south of Taoan or Chengchiatun. Ma Chan-shan was told that his reply to the above communication was expected by noon on November 16. But nothing was heard from him within the required time limit. Not only that, his troops surrounded the Japanese Consulate at Tsitsihar on the pretext of guarding it, and set up military works in the neighbourhood with ordnances trained at the front gate. The Consulate was entirely isolated, all communication with the outside 15 -being prevented. Even Chinese servants were not allowed freely to go out and get provisions. So Consul Shimizu and Major Hayashi were obliged to leave Tsitsihar for Harbin on the morning of November 14. On November 16, at about 10 p.m., a telephone message was received from Ma Chan-shan through Chang Ching-hui, Director of the Harbin Special District, to the effect that he was ready to accept the whole of the conditions proposed by Japan, but that he would formally reply by letter. This was ten hours after the time limit set by our proposal, and instead of being delivered, as it should have been, through a responsible representative of the Heilung-kiang Provincial Government, it came through an irresponsible third party. These and other circum-stances apparently roused suspicions as to the sincerity of General Ma. It looked as if he was watching the possible change of atmosphere at the Council of the League of Nations, and that his idea in forwarding this belated message through an irregular medium was simply to provide a diplomatic excuse in view of future negotiations, a customary Chinese procedure. Accordingly instructions were sent to the Japanese officers at Harbin to exercise circumspect judgment in connection with this matter. The promised written answer did not come to the hands of these officers up to 1 p.m. on November 17. So they made inquiries of General Liu, Civil Administrator and Representative of the Heilung· - 16 -kiang Government. It, then, transpired that a telephone message had been received at his office from General Ma to the following effect : (1) That the Japanese detachment should retire simultaneously with the Heilungkiang army. (2) That activities of bandits and other circum· stances might necessitate the despatch of troops south of the Chinese Eastern Railway for the purpose of preserving peace and order. (3) That the acceptance of the Japanese proposal would be impossible except on condition that the Japanese army would not permit General Chang Hai-peng's troops to enter Heilungkiang Province. On the same afternoon Consul-General Ohashi at Harbin also received an answer which was no more reassuring as to the sincerity of General Ma than that addressed to the military mission already referred to. While thus dilly-dallying with the Japanese army on the spot, General Ma reported to General Chang Hsueh-liang and General Wang Pu·lin at Peiping that he had peremptorily rejected the Japanese proposal. At the same time he caused foreigners at Harbin to send out telegrams saying that he had accepted the Japanese overtures. He evidently intended to play up to the League of Nations Council with a view to turning the scale of diplomacy in favour of his country. As a matter of fact the Chinese troops on the spot, numerically much stronger than the Japanese, began to show increasing activities from about - 17 -November 11, assuming a provocative attitude. Forestalling the arrival of the relief party from the 8th Division, the Chinese forces started offensive movements on November 17. The challenge was ac-cepted by our detachment which at once began action. Even then the Chinese did not give up their game of diplomatic manoeuvring. At one o'clock on the afternoon of November 18, that is to say two days after the lapse of the time limit for reply, Generals Liu and Chang, speaking for General Ma, forwarded another reply to this effect : (1) That the forces concentrated in the neighbour· hood of Angangchi in connection with the present trouble would be evacuated within ten days. (2) That as soon as the present trouble was settled no troops would be sent south of the Chinese Eastern Railway. (3) That the Taonan-Angangchi line being a Chinese railway, it was China's responsibility to protect it, and that it would be operated upon the settlement of the present trouble, Chinese agreeing to the condition that she should offer no inter-ference with its operation. 2. Strength and Disposition of Ma's Army As already stated General Ma, while indulging in prevaricatory manoeuvres in regard to the repeated overtures of the Commander of the Kwantung Army for peace, was actually engaged in military preparations. He concentrated in the neighbourhood - 18 -of Tsitsihar the greater part of the Heilungkiang army and of the military guards of the Chinese Eastern Railway, consisting altogether of between 20,000 and 30,000 infantry and cavalry, 30 pieces of artillery, over 10 pieces of trench mortars, and 2 anti-aircraft guns. Of these, the forces concen-trated in the neighbourhood of Angangchi comprised approximately 7,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 20 pieces of artillery. They were encamped along a line which, starting from Tahsingtun, extended through Hsiaohsintun and Sanchienfang to the west of the last mentioned place, with the cavalry placed in front of the left wing. A separate position was prepared facing west at a place to the south-west of Fulaerhchi. The disposition of General Ma's forces on or about November 8 is shown in the accompanying sketch on page 19. It appears that General Ma completed the final disposition of his troops on November 11, when their activities became particularly noticeable. The following morning his cavalry was sent to the right of the Nonni detachment. Its vanguard now and then appeared in front of our line, thereby occasioning minor conflicts. The situation steadily became serious. On the night of November 13, a portion of General Ma's army ventured forth to Changhuayuan and Alihsintun, thereby threatening to envelop our detachment. The relative positions of the two opposing forces on November 14, were as given in the accompanying sketch map on page 20. General Line-up of Gen. Ma·s Force.s South of .Angangchi { November 8, "131 ) NOles ~ enemy·s position~ under consuuct.10n <::=l imProved old position:> ~im~ '--· -:-:-:-: .. :-:--~ ._ ____ _ :::_.::--~; W#~-i..., """ 1 ' 7~000 ... '~ b § r;;:::~rucK u .statiOn ...... ~ - 20 The Confronting Front5 neaT Angangchi ( NOV. 1 4 ) Telimu .6r Enemy Force ,_,. Enemy' l'OSltion ~ Nonnt Detachment To TSits1ha.r iU18aru?th1tStat1DD) sla.Oh5intun @ ® @Tansing-tun ,_, '-' - 21 -According. to the subsequent information brought in by our scouting planes, the Heilungkiang army's line to the east and west of Sanchienfang was steadily extended, its right wing reaching to a point some 1,000 metres south of Telimu. The different positions were connected by deploying trenches. The enemy apparently worked hard at night. His positions at Tahsingtun, Hsiaohsintun and Sanchien-fang were soon surrounded with earth works with protected rifle holes, covered spaces, machine gun emplacements, and other appointments, which clear-ly indicated that this section was his central position. There were altogether four lines up to Tsitsihar. They were as follows : (1) The line stretching east and west of San-chienfang, with about 5,000 to 6,000 infantry, about 2,000 cavalry, and about 20 pieces of artillery. (2) The line extending from Angangchi eastward to Yushutun and Taiwangsanchiatze, with about 1,000 infantry, and about 700 cavalry. Besides, in the neighbourhood of Fulaerhchi there were stationed about 2,000 infantry, and about 1,000 cavalry, with 2 guns. (3) The line extending westward to Ssuchiatze from Shihwulitun, 10 kilometres south of Tsitsihar. ( 4) The line extending westward from the South Barracks, south of Tsitsihar. The last mentioned two lines were not yet actually manned by troops, but for that purpose there were kept in readiness at Tsitsihar a body of reserves consisting of the students of the branch military - 22 academy and the school for non-commissioned officers, the reserve regiments and part of artillery corps. 3. Activities of Japanese Army Prior to Engagement After the battle on the Nonni, the Nonni detach-ment (whose main body consisted of 4! battalions under the command of Major- General Hasebe) remained in the vicinity of Tahsing to protect the repairs of the bridges. By November 10, the repair work had progressed barely sufficient to allow open cars to pass. In the meantime the planes belonging to the detachment were daily engaged in scouting over the enemy's positions, principally at Angangchi. They were every time exposed to the enemy's fire, which was particularly severe on November 9, when fliers were wounded by anti-aircraft guns. It was probably a mere coincidence, but it is noteworthy that on the day (November 11) when it was decided to despatch to Manchuria a contingent from the 8th Division under the command of Major-General Suzuki to relieve the mixed Brigade from Chosen (Korea), General Ma's army, as already stated, commenced to show increased activities, succeeding in nearly enveloping the Nonni detach-ment. It being increasingly evident that Ma meant shortly to assume the offensive, the headquarters of the Kwantung Army, in order to be prepared for emergencies, ordered the main body of the 2nd · - 23 -Division to proceed to Tahsing on November 13, when the temporary repairs on the Nonni bridges were completed and the trial passage of a train was successfully carried out. In view of a possible offensive by the enemy, the Nonni detachment concentrated its main force in the neighbourhood of Tahsing, sending a contingent (two battalions of infantry and two companies of cavalry) to Tsienilipa to watch for developments and beat back the enemy's cavalry that had ventured to the back of our right wing. A party of our cavalry today was attacked by a superior b:>dy of the enemy's cavalry in the neighbourhood of Wunotouchan about 10 kilometres north-east of Tahsing, sustaining several casualties. A part of the detachment occupied, after a light engagement, W unotouchan and an elevated position about 1,500 metres south of Tangti. The main body of the 2nd Division nearly com-pleted its concentration at Tahsing and the neigh-bourhood of Kiangchiao. This part of the field passed into the control of the commander of the 2nd Division. The aggregate strength of our forces available for this district was 3,000 men, infantry and cavalry combined, with a little over 20 pieces of artillery. ' The Japanese forces were still too small, and as it became evident that Ma's army intended to turn into the offensive before the arrival of our relief party on its way from the 8th Division, it was decided on November 17, as an emergency measure, 24 to summon a part of the air forces respectively belonging to the 3rd, 12th and 20th Divisions. 4. Offensive by Japanese Ma's army showed a conspicuous activity on November 17, increasing its strength along the whole line, evidently with a view to starting the offensive movement before the arrival of our relief party and the newly summoned air force. There-upon the 2nd Division decided, as a measure of self-preservation, upon a counter attack. The plan of action was to push the main attack in the direction of Sanchienfang and neighbourhood, and after breaking through the enemy's line and routing him, to launch the main attack in the eastern and north-eastern directions, thus extending the battle front and endeavouring to crush the enemy in the vicinity of his positions. The Japanese forces were disposed as follows: (l) The right wing (about 4 battalions of infantry) to deploy east of the railway and attack the enemy in the neighbourhood of Hsiaohsintun. (2) The left wing (about 4 battalions of infantry) to deploy west of the railway and attack the enemy in the neighbourhood of Sanchienfang. (3) The artillery, of which the main force to take up position to the north of Tangti, while a smaller contingent to take up position respectively at the back of the right and left wings. 25 -( 4) The reserve to keep in readiness south of Tangti. The respective parties started motion half an hour after midnight on November 17, and by 3 a.m. they took up positions 700-800 metres in front of the enemy, preparatory for the attack. It was pitch dark and intensely cold with the thermometre registering 20 degrees below zero and the wind blowing from the north-west at the rate of 15 metres. About the same time the enemy's infantry began· to fire in the dark, and as the eastern sky began to grow grey at about six, more machine guns and rifles came into play. But the Japanese troops did not reply. At six-thirty, our artillery commenced firing to find the range, and at eight started bombardment which was kept up 'for about an hour, during which time our air forces, in co-operation with the artillery, bombed the enemy's position. As our artillery range was extended, the first line of our infantry started the attack at about nine. Hand to hand fights took place at several points. Unable to stand our furious onslaught any longer, the enemy began to retire along the whble front at about ten-thirty, fleeing along the Taonan-Angangchi railway on both sides of it. Thereupon the 2nd Division pursued the retreating enemy toward Tsitsihar, its main body marching along the railway on the western side and a portion of it on the eastern side. Hotly pursued, the enemy was unable to make a stand at his second line of defence iri the neighbourhood of Angangchi, retreat· - 26 -ing from there northward at about two in the afternoon. The officers and men of the 2nd Division were thoroughly tired as the result of continued and strenuous exertions for the past several days, and they suffered much from increasing cold and wind, which froze their food and water. But nothing daunted, they pursued the retreating enemy and arrived at a point 4 kilometres south of Tsitsihar half an hour after midnight on November 18. But our troops were in some places badly mixed up with the fleeing enemy, so that there was danger of our own men fighting each other. It was, there· fore, decided to concentrate the main body in the vicinity of Tamintun, south of Tsitsihar, where they had a long-needed rest. At noon on November 19, the main body of the 2nd Division formed in two columns, and leaving the line at Tamintun and Shihwulitun, they entered Tsitsihar at three in the afternoon. The bulk of it was quartered at the South Barracks and the remainder at the North Barracks, leaving the duty of keeping order in the town to the Chinese Director of the Bureau of Public Safety. The main body of Ma's army seemed to have retreated in the direction of Hailun (120 kilometres north of Harbin and on the Hulan-Hailun railway) and Paichuan. By the nightfall on November 19, there was not visible any important body of Ma's troops, except small insignificant parties, within a radius of 30 kilometres of Tsitsihar. - 27 -Our casualties consisted of 31 killed, 104 wounded and 13 missing, besides 300 cases of frostbite. The Chinese casualties must have been very heavy, but no reliable estimate has been forthcoming. It is hardly necessary to state that during this engagement the Japanese army took care to respect the property of the Chinese Eastern Railway. It also so arranged the plan of operations as to prevent the Chinese troops from retreating along the railway toward Harbin. In conclusion it may be stated that this engage-ment was undertaken by the Kwantung Army simply as a measure of self-preservation. Conse-quently as soon as Ma's army which menaced our rights and interests had been disposed of, the main body of our troops was withdrawn, without occupy· ing that part of the country. III. TIENTSIN INCIDENT After the outbreak of the Manchurian trouble, the sentiment among the Chinese at Tientsin grew steadily more and more unfriendly toward the Japanese. The Anti-Japanese Association's activities became better organized. The situation was com· plicated by the fact that the local Chinese, who had never been particularly cordial toward Chang Hsueh-liang, now grew hostile toward him, whose maladministration they held responsible for the Manchurian catastrophe. In order to check the growing popular antagonism toward him, Chang secretly planned to carry out a policy of drastic suppression against the promoters of the hostile movement against him. The anti-Chang leaders got wind of this, and with the object of forestalling the approaching danger, they set about organizing a force of plain clothes soldiers, which they styled The Nation Saving Army. On the night of November 8, men of this organization suddenly created trouble in the Chinese city of Tientsin, attacking the guardians of public order. The Commander of our garrison there made a public declaration of strict neutrality with regard to the clash between the contending Chinese factions. - 29 -Measures were at once taken by him for the maintenance of order in the Japanese settlement and the protection of the lives and property of the Japanese residents. But the Chinese guards stationed in the vicinity of the Japanese settlement fired into a position occupied by our troops, killing two of the latter. Thereupon our troops had to return the fire as a matter of self-defence. The Commander of our garrison at once .com-municated with the Chinese authorities, and request-ed them, with a view to avoid precipitating an unfortunate crisis between Japan and China, to order the contending Chinese factions not to approach within 300 metres of the Japanese settle-ment. This request was repeated twice or three times, but it was not readily acted upon. As a matter of fact plain clothes soldiers constantly made their appearance, the Chinese troops also firing in the vicinity of the Japanese settlement. The Chinese authorities continued outwardly friendly, but there is reason to believe that th~y were secretly fanning the anti-Japanese feeling of their people. In any case the situation became so serious that the other foreign garrisons mounted guard in their respective areas from the 11th or 12th of November. It transpired shortly afterward that the firing of the Japanese position by Chinese soldiers, which had been alleged to have been directed toward the plain clothes men belonging to the Nation Saving --- 30 Army, was really part of a deliberate scheme of harassing the Japanese planned by Chinese officers in high positions. On this amazing fact becoming known, the Chinese authorities offered a profound apology to the Commander of the Japanese garrison. They also promised to exercise a more effective control over the anti·Japanese propaganda, to remove all military works set up within 300 metres of the Japanese settlement, and not to permit their soldiers to approach within 300 metres of the settlement. But the dangerous practice of firing into the settle· ment did not cease, and the situation continued to be disquieting. The Japanese garrison, however, remained faithful to its own part of the agreement. It called off part of its guard, restored the traffic in the settlement to its normal condition, and in the afternoon of November 26 it disbanded the volunteer corps. At eight that evening, the Chinese suddenly opened a stiff firing upon our barracks from a position to the west of it. Our troops did not reply to it, but a remonstrance was at once made to the Chinese authorities against the extraordinary behaviour of their soldiers, demanding the cessa· tion of the firing. They alleged that the firing was directed against the Nation Saving Army and was not meant for the Japanese settlement, but they promised that in any case it would be stopped before half past ten. But the firing did not cease ~ntil noon the following day. It was a deliberate act 31 -of hostility, so that our garrison decided upon the only course left to it for the protection of the Japanese life and property in the settlement. In other words, it had to accept the challenge and fight the Chinese. On the morning of November 29, a representative of the Chinese authorities called at the headquarters of the Japanese garrison, and offered to withdraw all armed people from the neighbourhood of the Japanese settlement and also to remove all defence works set up in the Chinese city. This offer being accepted, the armed Chinese police were withdrawn by the evening of November 29, while the defence works were removed the following day. \ IV. CHINCHOW EPISODE 1. Chinchow Government's Hostile Preparations After the battle of Angangchi, Ma's army seemed for a while bent upon an attempt to recover Tsitsihar. But on about December 11 there was concluded a compromise agreement between hiPl and Chang Ching-hui. In the meanwhile matters were steadily improving in the Province of Fengtien. On about December 16 General Tsang Shih-i, former Governor of Liaoning, accepted the post of Governor of Fengtien offered to him by a group of leading inhabitants of the province. It was evident that the movement for reconstruction was growing strong in the three north-earstern provinces with the excep-tion of the south-western corner of Fengtien. In the neighbourhood of Chinchow, there was stationed a large force of regular troops belonging to Chang Hsueh-liang. Its strength was estimated at about 35,000 men, with a fairly strong artillery equipment. Its main body occupied a strong posi-tion on the right bank of the Taling-ho (see Chart IV), while a detachment was stationed in the terri-tory between that river and the Liao-ho. While in this way preparations were being steadily pushed 33 -forward with a view to a clash with Japanese forces, the auxiliary troops and volunteers under the control of the Chingchow Government began to show great activities as soon as the Japanese con-tingent that had been advancing to the west of the Liao-ho turned back. These irregulars tried hard · to cause disturbances along the South Manchuria Railway. Chang Hsueh-liang at first built high hopes upon the support of the League of Nations. But when he found that, Japan's attitude being determined, much could not be expected from that quarter, he made up his mind to fight Japan with the help and co-operation of Nangking. With this object in "iiew, he concentrated to the east of Chinchow a strong army of regulars, 35,000 strong, made up of 3~ brigades of infantry, a brigade and a regiment of artillery. The first line occupied positions extending along Changwu, Paichipu, Taian and Tienchuangtai, with an advanced detachment in the neighbourhood of Fakumen. Besides, as already stated, the territory along the South Manchuria Railway was infested'by a strong body of irregulars under the control of Chang Hsueh-liang. It was made up of about 30,000 auxiliaries and about 5,000 volunteers. In addition to these forces, bandits invited from differ-ent parts of Manchuria were being organized into units. This was coincident with a general outbreak of bandit activities along the main line of the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden line, causing no small damage to Japanese subjects. - 34 -~ It is estimated by competent authorities that the armed forces, comprising the regulars, the irregulars and all other units under the direct or indirect control of the Chinchow Government, exceeded 80,000. Heterogeneous as were their complexions and formations, .they were all united in their hostile attitude toward Japan. So unless Chang Hsueh-liang was prepared to change his policy, it was now clear that a clash was inevitable between them and the Japanese army. 2. Reinforcements from Japan In view of the increased activities of Chinese troops and bandits in Manchuria and of the serious situation at Tientsin, it was decided on December 17 to despatch a specially constituted brigade, together with a force of heavy artillery and a party of rear service men to Manchuria, while a detach-ment chiefly composed of two battalions of infantry was sent to Tientsin. By this time the organization of various irregular contingents by the Chinchow Government had made a great progress, so that disturbances of peace and order by these forces now became more widespread and serious than before. Taking advantage of the freezing of the Liao-ho, they crossed that river to its left bank in large force, and a large body of them, 2,500 strong, took possession of the town of Nieu-chwang on December 26, while the district to its north and west was in the occupation of several - 35 -thousand volunteers. These forces, it is needless to say, had penetrated so far eastward with the object of creating diversions in the rear of the Japanese detachment that was operating to the west of the Liao-ho. By recent experience it was well-known that the fighting capacity of these irregulars was much greater than that of ordinary bandits. Their comrades along the Antung-Mukden line also showed no sign of lessened activities. Under these circumstances, it became evident that the troops available were insufficient for suppressing irregulars and bandits infesting the territory west of the Liao-ho, in addition to dealing with those threatening the various railway lines. So on December 27, at 6 p.m., Imperial sanction was given to the despatch of the headquarters of the 20th Division and its Y oda brigade to Manchuria to be placed under the orders of the Commander of the K wan tung Army. All these forces in due time arrived in Manchuria. ' 3. Operations in West of Liao-ho The disturbances caused by the routed soldiers and bandits in the territory west of the Liao-ho, and which threatened to spread to regions nearer the· South Manchuria Railway lines, having become very serious, the main body of the Kwantung Army was ordered to suppress these marauding bands of Chinese peace breakers. The Japanese army started on its important expedition on December 28, the - 36 -Kamura Brigade proceeding along the Peiping-Mukden Railway and the Taman division along its branch line. The main part of that division left Tienchuangtai on December 28, and proceeded along the route assigned to it, always taking care to exercise proper pressure upon such Chinese troops and auxiliaries as may happen to be in the neighbour-hood. It reached Tawa at dark, and the following day it continued its march. At two in the after-noon its vanguard occupied Panshan after a slight fighting. The Chinese force occupying that place was about 500 strong, made up of regular troops belonging to the 19th brigade (654th regiment) who . were in cooperation with auxiliaries. The division reached the neighbourhood. of Huchiawupu on December 30. ·-The Kamura brigade left Hsinmintun on December 30,. and proceeding along the main line of the Peiping-Mukden Railway, reached Tahushan at nightfall. On the way it met and dispersed some parties of marauders. On December 31, the Kamura brigade reached the neighbourhood of Koupangtze. As for the Tamon division, a part of it reached Koupangtze, while its main force reached a point to the south-east of that place on the same day. 1 On January 1, the Kamura brigade proceeded in the direction of the Taling-ho and reached Shihshan-chan at noon, while the train that carried its vanguard arrived at the railway bridge over the Taling-ho, at 3 p.m. The Tamon division was - 37 -occupied in concentrating its forces in the neighbour-hood of Koupangtze. The; <:hinese forces that took part in the engage-ments east of the Taling-ho comprised two regiments of the 19th brigade, nearly the whole of the 20th brigade, a portion of the 3rd cavalry brigade and volunteers. The casualties they sustained are estimated at 2,000. At daybreak on January 2, the Yoda brigade, · now forming part of the Muro division, advanced by the Peiping-Mukden Railway to the rear of the Tamon division. That night the Kamura brigade was quartered in villages between Shuangyangtien (8 kilometres east of Chinchow) and Talinghotien; while the Y oda brigade stayed at villages between Shihshanchan and Koupangtze. The K CIS (/l >. .,. u -o~;:;j~ ~8t-<1J ..... .0 "0 ..c:: ~ !:! .~ 1: E-t 0 ~-CIS -~ 0 "0 • .8 oo ...... CIS-.:1' CIS

Fightings around Shanghai.

Abstract

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Fightings around Shanghai.

Abstract

Extracted data

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