G. E. Moore’s position in the moral philosophy canon is paradoxical. On the one hand, he is widely regarded as the most influential moral philosopher of the twentieth century. On the other hand, his most characteristic doctrines are now more often ridiculed than defended or even discussed seriously. I shall discuss briefly a number of Moorean topics—the nonnaturalness of “good,” the open question argument, the relation of the right and the good, whether fundamental value is intrinsic, and the role of beauty—hoping to explain how a philosophically informed person could actually be a Moorean even today.
The analytical requirements of Moore in ethical questions are so high that we labour under the impre...
One of the most fundamental questions about G. E. Moore's ethical\ud intuitionism relates to its sco...
In this paper, I examine how philosophers before and after G. E. Moore understood intrinsic value. T...
G. E. Moore’s position in the moral philosophy canon is paradoxical. On the one hand, he is widely r...
“Good” is the central concept in George Edward Moore’s value theory. Moore, who has an influential w...
Metaethical Mooreanism is the view that without being able to explain how we know certain moral clai...
When Principia Ethica appeared, in 1903, it became something of a sacred text for the Cambridge-educ...
G. E. Moore famously argued against skepticism and idealism by appealing to their inconsi...
This dissertation is an attempt to apply the Moorean response to radical skepticism to moral skeptic...
In “The Nature of Judgment” (1899), G. E. Moore defends the strange thesis according to which “[i]t ...
I defend and explicate a Moorean program in value theory. I claim that intrinsic goodness is the fun...
G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica has exerted almost unparalleled influence upon the moral philosophy o...
G. E. Moore (1903) famously held that moral properties are “autonomous, ” that they are distinct fro...
Several contemporary virtue ethicists have provided systematic presentations of normative virtue eth...
In “The Nature of Judgment” (1899), G. E. Moore defends the strange thesis according to which “[i]t ...
The analytical requirements of Moore in ethical questions are so high that we labour under the impre...
One of the most fundamental questions about G. E. Moore's ethical\ud intuitionism relates to its sco...
In this paper, I examine how philosophers before and after G. E. Moore understood intrinsic value. T...
G. E. Moore’s position in the moral philosophy canon is paradoxical. On the one hand, he is widely r...
“Good” is the central concept in George Edward Moore’s value theory. Moore, who has an influential w...
Metaethical Mooreanism is the view that without being able to explain how we know certain moral clai...
When Principia Ethica appeared, in 1903, it became something of a sacred text for the Cambridge-educ...
G. E. Moore famously argued against skepticism and idealism by appealing to their inconsi...
This dissertation is an attempt to apply the Moorean response to radical skepticism to moral skeptic...
In “The Nature of Judgment” (1899), G. E. Moore defends the strange thesis according to which “[i]t ...
I defend and explicate a Moorean program in value theory. I claim that intrinsic goodness is the fun...
G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica has exerted almost unparalleled influence upon the moral philosophy o...
G. E. Moore (1903) famously held that moral properties are “autonomous, ” that they are distinct fro...
Several contemporary virtue ethicists have provided systematic presentations of normative virtue eth...
In “The Nature of Judgment” (1899), G. E. Moore defends the strange thesis according to which “[i]t ...
The analytical requirements of Moore in ethical questions are so high that we labour under the impre...
One of the most fundamental questions about G. E. Moore's ethical\ud intuitionism relates to its sco...
In this paper, I examine how philosophers before and after G. E. Moore understood intrinsic value. T...