Rethinking Reform of the FCC: A Reply to Randolph May

This brief Article responds to Randolph May\u27s article, Recent Developments in Administrative Law-The FCC\u27s Tumultuous Year in 2003: An Essay on an Opportunity for Institutional Agency Reform, 56 Admin. L. Rev. 1307 (2004). Taylor disputes May\u27s anecdotal evidence that the FCC\u27s poor handling of the Triennial Review and the media ownership proceedings are symptomatic of a broad agency inefficiency that should be remedied by drastically cutting the size of the FCC and placing it under the exclusive control of the executive branch to ensure electoral accountability. Taylor argues that while these suggestions may have value, such a rush to action should not be premised on anecdotal evidence, but instead must rest on a more empirical, objective undertaking that would study the FCC\u27s track record. Furthermore, Taylor points out that there are numerous other avenues for reforming the communications regulatory regime: Congress, states, and international organizations. Taylor concludes by analogizing the United Kingdom\u27s OFCOM to the FCC proposed by May. He argues that though OFCOM\u27s centralized structure and greater accountability have advantages, it also results in a more partisan regulatory process with less transparency. Further, the delays and inefficiencies that May criticizes in the FCC may be inherent in any agency decisionmaking that solicits and invites public comment, regardless of the agency\u27s structure