Add to ORKGThe endogenous formation of coalitions involving asymmetric firms and their stability are analyzed as a function of differences in efficiency and of the fixed cost of production. Results are derived for cartels as well as for mergers. Players have constant but different marginal costs of production and no rule of product sharing is fixed. The analysis is illustrated for a specific path of collusion. Finally welfare effects are studied and some conclusions are drawn for antitrust policy.N/
We study cartel stability when firms maintain collusion only if it is more profitable than competiti...
In the context of an in\u85nitely repeated capacity-constrained price game, we endogenize the compos...
In non-cooperative open membership cartel formation games, it is usually assumed that cartel members...
In this paper we review a number of coalitional solution concepts for the analysis of cartel and mer...
Using the coefficient of cooperation, we analyse the effect of cost asymmetries on collusive agreeme...
Using the coefficient of cooperation, we analyse the effect of cost asymmetries on collusive agreeme...
The effect of delegation on cartel stability is addressed in a duopoly for a homogeneous product, un...
In their merger control, EU and the US have considered symmetric size distribution (cost structure) ...
This paper analyzes endogenous merger formation in oligopolistic markets where firms have different ...
In this paper, we study the optimal number of active firms in acoalition and in a merger. We conside...
This article analyses cartels that act as a Stackelberg leader with respect to a competitive fringe ...
We investigate the stability of cooperation agreements, such as those agreed by cartels, among firms...
This paper studies the incentives of firms selling vertically differentiated products to merge. To t...
This paper uses an endogenous coalition formation game to derive an upper bound to industry concentr...
Working paper GATE 08-14In this paper, we study the impact of a merger on collusion depending on the...
We study cartel stability when firms maintain collusion only if it is more profitable than competiti...
In the context of an in\u85nitely repeated capacity-constrained price game, we endogenize the compos...
In non-cooperative open membership cartel formation games, it is usually assumed that cartel members...
In this paper we review a number of coalitional solution concepts for the analysis of cartel and mer...
Using the coefficient of cooperation, we analyse the effect of cost asymmetries on collusive agreeme...
Using the coefficient of cooperation, we analyse the effect of cost asymmetries on collusive agreeme...
The effect of delegation on cartel stability is addressed in a duopoly for a homogeneous product, un...
In their merger control, EU and the US have considered symmetric size distribution (cost structure) ...
This paper analyzes endogenous merger formation in oligopolistic markets where firms have different ...
In this paper, we study the optimal number of active firms in acoalition and in a merger. We conside...
This article analyses cartels that act as a Stackelberg leader with respect to a competitive fringe ...
We investigate the stability of cooperation agreements, such as those agreed by cartels, among firms...
This paper studies the incentives of firms selling vertically differentiated products to merge. To t...
This paper uses an endogenous coalition formation game to derive an upper bound to industry concentr...
Working paper GATE 08-14In this paper, we study the impact of a merger on collusion depending on the...
We study cartel stability when firms maintain collusion only if it is more profitable than competiti...
In the context of an in\u85nitely repeated capacity-constrained price game, we endogenize the compos...
In non-cooperative open membership cartel formation games, it is usually assumed that cartel members...