A label that imperfectly signals product quality is analyzed in a Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products. Considering strategic firms when certification is imperfect has some important implications. A separating equilibrium can be sustained with a free test due to price strategic complementarity. When the certifier’s objective is welfare, and the test cost is sufficiently small, the most appropriate test is that which is subject to a low rate of false negatives
We analyze a duopoly model where firms sell conspicuous goods to horizontally- and vertically-differ...
Financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council Grant ES/N01829X/1 is gratefully ack...
We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of price...
Viscusi (1978) shows how, in markets with quality uncertainty, perfect certification results in sepa...
Abstract: We compare certification to a minimum quality standard (MQS) policy in a duopolistic indus...
We compare certification to a minimum quality standard (MQS) policy in a duopolistic industry where ...
This paper offers a theoretical analysis of imperfect competition in certification markets. Firms th...
An economic analysis of quality signals: labels and product quality certification This paper studie...
This paper focuses on consumer confusion when firms may choose between credible and non-credible cer...
Asymmetric information is a classic example of market failure that undermines the efficiency associa...
The paper offers a simple theory of pricing behavior in certification markets. The basis for the the...
This paper considers price competition in a duopoly with quality uncertainty. The established firm (...
Within a vertical relationship between a producer and a retailer we study each side’s incentives to ...
We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of price...
Accreditation is increasingly important worldwide; however, some industries have higher accreditatio...
We analyze a duopoly model where firms sell conspicuous goods to horizontally- and vertically-differ...
Financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council Grant ES/N01829X/1 is gratefully ack...
We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of price...
Viscusi (1978) shows how, in markets with quality uncertainty, perfect certification results in sepa...
Abstract: We compare certification to a minimum quality standard (MQS) policy in a duopolistic indus...
We compare certification to a minimum quality standard (MQS) policy in a duopolistic industry where ...
This paper offers a theoretical analysis of imperfect competition in certification markets. Firms th...
An economic analysis of quality signals: labels and product quality certification This paper studie...
This paper focuses on consumer confusion when firms may choose between credible and non-credible cer...
Asymmetric information is a classic example of market failure that undermines the efficiency associa...
The paper offers a simple theory of pricing behavior in certification markets. The basis for the the...
This paper considers price competition in a duopoly with quality uncertainty. The established firm (...
Within a vertical relationship between a producer and a retailer we study each side’s incentives to ...
We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of price...
Accreditation is increasingly important worldwide; however, some industries have higher accreditatio...
We analyze a duopoly model where firms sell conspicuous goods to horizontally- and vertically-differ...
Financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council Grant ES/N01829X/1 is gratefully ack...
We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of price...
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