I discuss Benacerraf's epistemological challenge for realism about areas like mathematics, metalogic, and modality, and describe the pluralist response to it. I explain why normative pluralism is peculiarly unsatisfactory, and use this explanation to formulate a radicalization of Moore's Open Question Argument. According to the argument, the facts -- even the normative facts -- fail to settle the practical questions at the center of our normative lives. One lesson is that the concepts of realism and objectivity, which are widely identified, are actually in tension
In Truth and Objectivity, Crispin Wright argues that because truth is a distinctively normative prop...
In this presentation, I explore the possibility of combining pluralism and scientific realism in the...
This paper puts forward and defends an account of mathematical truth, and in particular an account o...
I discuss Benacerraf's epistemological challenge for realism about areas like mathematics, metalogic...
I this article, I introduce the notion of pluralism about an area, and use it to argue that the ques...
Pluralist mathematical realism, the view that there exists more than one mathematical universe, has ...
This dissertation is centered around a set of apparently conflicting intuitions that we may have abo...
Non-skeptical robust realists about normativity, mathematics, or any other domain of non- causal tru...
Two kinds of pluralism have recently come to the attention of metaphysicians. Ontological pluralism ...
This paper is an attempt to convince anti-realists that their correct intuitions against the metaphy...
The purpose of this paper is to analize whether Goodman’s pluralism leaves room for a correspondenti...
This paper is an attempt to convince anti-realists that their correct intuitions against the metaphy...
Set-theoretic pluralism is an increasingly influential position in the philosophy of set theory (Bal...
In this paper, I discuss full-blooded Platonism (the claim that all possible mathematical objects ex...
In Truth and Objectivity, Crispin Wright argues that because truth is a distinctively normative prop...
In this presentation, I explore the possibility of combining pluralism and scientific realism in the...
This paper puts forward and defends an account of mathematical truth, and in particular an account o...
I discuss Benacerraf's epistemological challenge for realism about areas like mathematics, metalogic...
I this article, I introduce the notion of pluralism about an area, and use it to argue that the ques...
Pluralist mathematical realism, the view that there exists more than one mathematical universe, has ...
This dissertation is centered around a set of apparently conflicting intuitions that we may have abo...
Non-skeptical robust realists about normativity, mathematics, or any other domain of non- causal tru...
Two kinds of pluralism have recently come to the attention of metaphysicians. Ontological pluralism ...
This paper is an attempt to convince anti-realists that their correct intuitions against the metaphy...
The purpose of this paper is to analize whether Goodman’s pluralism leaves room for a correspondenti...
This paper is an attempt to convince anti-realists that their correct intuitions against the metaphy...
Set-theoretic pluralism is an increasingly influential position in the philosophy of set theory (Bal...
In this paper, I discuss full-blooded Platonism (the claim that all possible mathematical objects ex...
In Truth and Objectivity, Crispin Wright argues that because truth is a distinctively normative prop...
In this presentation, I explore the possibility of combining pluralism and scientific realism in the...
This paper puts forward and defends an account of mathematical truth, and in particular an account o...