Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) prohibit the management of a firm from unilaterally increasing the wage during contract negotiations without the union\u27s approval. We show how the management can strategically increase the wage during negotiations without violating the NLRA. Increasing the wage during negotiations will upset the union\u27s incentive to strike and decrease the union\u27s bargaining power, thereby shrinking the set of equilibrium contracts in the firm\u27s favor. Indeed, as the union becomes more patient, the set of equilibrium wages converges to the best equilibrium outcome to the firm
This paper provides an efficient union-firm bargaining solution within the right to manage frame-wor...
This paper develops a model of wage and employment determination under the threat of unionization. T...
A well-documented problem motivates this symposium: The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) does not...
Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act prevent a ¯rm from unilaterally inc...
Workers obtain wage increases by having labour market power. This labour market power can be achieve...
The conventional National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) remedy against an employer who has violated s...
The significant increase in employer proposals for concessions at the collective bargaining table ha...
The amended National Labor Relations Act (the Act) guarantees that employers, employees, and labor ...
Under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), employees are entitled “to bargain colle...
This paper analyses a strategic bargaining game where the firm mayor may not be able to sell out of ...
Whilst there is a significant empirical literature on the effects of unions on pay discrimination, t...
A firm undertakes workers’ productivity improving R&D before negotiating wage with the union, where ...
This paper provides a thorough equilibrium analysis of a wage contract negotiation model where the u...
This paper develops a simple model as to why unionized Cournot firms acting non-cooperatively in the...
Employer and union had an existing collective agreement which provided detailed procedures for adjus...
This paper provides an efficient union-firm bargaining solution within the right to manage frame-wor...
This paper develops a model of wage and employment determination under the threat of unionization. T...
A well-documented problem motivates this symposium: The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) does not...
Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act prevent a ¯rm from unilaterally inc...
Workers obtain wage increases by having labour market power. This labour market power can be achieve...
The conventional National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) remedy against an employer who has violated s...
The significant increase in employer proposals for concessions at the collective bargaining table ha...
The amended National Labor Relations Act (the Act) guarantees that employers, employees, and labor ...
Under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), employees are entitled “to bargain colle...
This paper analyses a strategic bargaining game where the firm mayor may not be able to sell out of ...
Whilst there is a significant empirical literature on the effects of unions on pay discrimination, t...
A firm undertakes workers’ productivity improving R&D before negotiating wage with the union, where ...
This paper provides a thorough equilibrium analysis of a wage contract negotiation model where the u...
This paper develops a simple model as to why unionized Cournot firms acting non-cooperatively in the...
Employer and union had an existing collective agreement which provided detailed procedures for adjus...
This paper provides an efficient union-firm bargaining solution within the right to manage frame-wor...
This paper develops a model of wage and employment determination under the threat of unionization. T...
A well-documented problem motivates this symposium: The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) does not...