Assertion and relative truth

An account of assertion along truth-relativistic lines is offered. The main lines of relativism about truth are laid out and the problematic features that assertion acquires in the presence of relative truth are identified. These features are the possibility of coherently formulating norms of assertion and the possibility of grounding a rational practice of assertion upon relative truth. A solution to these problems is provided by formulating norms for making and assessing assertions that employ a suitably relativized truth predicate and a perspectival notion of correctness. Two potential objections to this proposal are addressed.Fil: Caso, Ramiro. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Instituto de Filosofía "dr.alejandro Korn". Area de Lógica Filosofía del Lenguaje; Argentin