From Fundamental Ontology Toward Fundamental Anthropology: Subject as a Negativity (Hegel, Kojève, Heidegger, and Sartre)

My research is devoted to the study of the subject’s place in modern philosophy and above all the philosophy of the twentieth century (such as existentialism, phenomenology and dialectics). Underlying this research is the principle of the so-called refusal of transcendence. The concept of transcendence played an important role in defining the nature of the subject in classical modern philosophy. With the refusal of this concept, in a number of contexts of the philosophy of twentieth century, the representation of the subject changes. In this research, it is to be studied which changes in particular are going to happen with the subject in connection with this. The main philosophical context of the research will be Hegel’s philosophy, as well as the philosophical approaches of Kojève, Sartre, and Heidegger. An analysis of the legacy of these authors will show that a project of what can be called a fundamental anthropology appeared, and replaced the usual fundamental ontology. Within the framework of that project, mostly by refusing the classical concept of “subject”, the emphasis begins to fall on the special status of the person and their way of existence in the world. The central concept that underlies these transformations is that of “negativity”. In this research, a detailed reconstruction of the idea of negativity in Hegel, Kojève, Sartre, and Heidegger, pointing out the similarities and differences in their philosophical approaches and how they relate negativity to the person, will underpin a presentation of the logic of the appearance of the concept of negativity and its connection to the role of the person in the world. Whether a man is the engine of progress, the crown jewel of creation, or a humble witness to independently developing processes of history, directly depends on what role is attributed to the subject and its place in the world