The second-price sealed-bid common-value auction exhibits lower winner's curse probability compared to the rst-price auction for any number of bidders. For both auction types, above a certain threshold adding more bidders increases the chances of the winner's curse only marginally while it decreases potential losses to the bidders and increases revenue. Below this threshold, having fewer bidders lowers the winner's curse probability and the losses to the bidders, but also the average revenue
This paper presents a replication and extension of experiments with the "winner's curse" which were ...
This paper provides some striking results that arise in the unique symmetric equilibrium of common v...
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the o...
The second-price sealed-bid common-value auction exhibits lower winner's curse probability compared ...
Within an affiliated value auction setting, we study the relationship between the number of bidders...
File URL: http://www.cni.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/documents/RePEc/cni/working_paper/athias_nunez_2006_...
Within an affiliated value auction setting, we study the relationship between the number of bidders ...
We empirically assess the winner’s curse effect in auctions for toll road concessions. First, we inv...
Auctions of government securities typically permit bidders to enter multiple price-quantity bids. De...
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the o...
In this paper, we empirically assess the effects of the winner’s curse in auctions for road concessi...
Abstract: In common value auctions the winning bid often exceeds the value of the good purchased. T...
This paper presents a replication and extension of experiments with the "winner's curse" which were ...
This paper provides some striking results that arise in the unique symmetric equilibrium of common v...
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the o...
The second-price sealed-bid common-value auction exhibits lower winner's curse probability compared ...
Within an affiliated value auction setting, we study the relationship between the number of bidders...
File URL: http://www.cni.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/documents/RePEc/cni/working_paper/athias_nunez_2006_...
Within an affiliated value auction setting, we study the relationship between the number of bidders ...
We empirically assess the winner’s curse effect in auctions for toll road concessions. First, we inv...
Auctions of government securities typically permit bidders to enter multiple price-quantity bids. De...
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the o...
In this paper, we empirically assess the effects of the winner’s curse in auctions for road concessi...
Abstract: In common value auctions the winning bid often exceeds the value of the good purchased. T...
This paper presents a replication and extension of experiments with the "winner's curse" which were ...
This paper provides some striking results that arise in the unique symmetric equilibrium of common v...
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the o...