We exploit a cohort discontinuity in the stringency of Dutch disability reforms to estimate the effects of decreased DI (disability insurance) generosity on behavior of existing recipients. We find evidence of social support substitution: individuals on average offset €1.00 of lost DI benefits by collecting €0.30 more from other social assistance programs, but this benefit-substitution effect declines over time. Individuals also exhibit a rebound in earnings: earnings increase by €0.62 on average per euro of lost DI benefits and this effect remains roughly constant over time. This is strong evidence of substantial remaining earnings capacity among long-term claimants of DI
Disability Insurance (DI) programs have long been criticized for their apparent work disincentives. ...
Erworben im Rahmen der Schweizer Nationallizenzen (http://www.nationallizenzen.ch)The effect of disa...
We provide a lifecycle framework for comparing the insurance value and the incentive cost of disabil...
We exploit a cohort discontinuity in the stringency of Dutch disability reforms to estimate the effe...
We exploit a cohort discontinuity in the stringency of Dutch disability reforms to estimate the effe...
This paper examines how a change in the generosity of one social assistance program generates spillo...
Accurate assessment of earnings capacity is critical to the efficient operation of disability insura...
In the 1980s and 1990s, disability benefit rates in the Netherlands were among the highest in the wo...
We analyze the employment effect of a law that provides for a 36 percent increase in thegenerosity o...
We analyze the employment effect of a law that provides for a 36% increase in the generosity of disa...
While a large share of Disability Insurance recipients in OECD countries are expected to recover, ou...
__Abstract__ We exploit an age discontinuity in a Dutch disability insurance (DI) reform to ident...
We provide a life-cycle framework for comparing insurance and disincentive effects of disability ben...
While a mature literature finds that Disability Insurance (DI) receipt discourages work, the welfare...
We study the welfare effects of disability insurance (DI) and derive social-optimality conditions fo...
Disability Insurance (DI) programs have long been criticized for their apparent work disincentives. ...
Erworben im Rahmen der Schweizer Nationallizenzen (http://www.nationallizenzen.ch)The effect of disa...
We provide a lifecycle framework for comparing the insurance value and the incentive cost of disabil...
We exploit a cohort discontinuity in the stringency of Dutch disability reforms to estimate the effe...
We exploit a cohort discontinuity in the stringency of Dutch disability reforms to estimate the effe...
This paper examines how a change in the generosity of one social assistance program generates spillo...
Accurate assessment of earnings capacity is critical to the efficient operation of disability insura...
In the 1980s and 1990s, disability benefit rates in the Netherlands were among the highest in the wo...
We analyze the employment effect of a law that provides for a 36 percent increase in thegenerosity o...
We analyze the employment effect of a law that provides for a 36% increase in the generosity of disa...
While a large share of Disability Insurance recipients in OECD countries are expected to recover, ou...
__Abstract__ We exploit an age discontinuity in a Dutch disability insurance (DI) reform to ident...
We provide a life-cycle framework for comparing insurance and disincentive effects of disability ben...
While a mature literature finds that Disability Insurance (DI) receipt discourages work, the welfare...
We study the welfare effects of disability insurance (DI) and derive social-optimality conditions fo...
Disability Insurance (DI) programs have long been criticized for their apparent work disincentives. ...
Erworben im Rahmen der Schweizer Nationallizenzen (http://www.nationallizenzen.ch)The effect of disa...
We provide a lifecycle framework for comparing the insurance value and the incentive cost of disabil...