Organizations and researchers always ask: How can we increase the profits of a company? Is there a way to improve the performance of managers? How can a company fulfill certain aims (such as high sales, high market share etc.)? Here, managerial bonuses play a role. This dissertation considers managerial delegation and bonus systems from a game theoretical perspective. It investigates how managerial incentives interact with each other. It studies how profits, production, welfare and international trade are affected by bonus systems. It searches the best bonus system for enterprises and introduces a new bonus system for companies. It also introduces a new solution method to the game theory literature
This paper analyses the effects of managerial delegation on the equilibrium outcomes in a duopoly ma...
In Contributions to game theory and management, vol. XI. Collected papers presented on the Eleventh ...
Economic interactions such as selling an item for profit or scheduling the time of a subcontractor f...
Organizations and researchers always ask: How can we increase the profits of a company? Is there a w...
By designing remuneration schemes based on a bonus rewarding specific firm-level outcomes, the owner...
Our primary objective in this paper is to analyse the utility of incentive mechanism in the workplac...
This paper challenges the results of the “classical” managerial delegation literature, where it is a...
We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates ...
This dissertation studies three mechanisms of managerial disciplining and incentive alignment propos...
We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates ...
Modern corporate governance codes include clauses requiring the disclosure of managerial compensatio...
This dissertation consists of three essays on the public goods game. Each essay is an experimental e...
Contributions to game theory and management, vol. X. Collected papers presented on the Tenth Interna...
This article revisits the managerial delegation literature led by Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Jud...
We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates ...
This paper analyses the effects of managerial delegation on the equilibrium outcomes in a duopoly ma...
In Contributions to game theory and management, vol. XI. Collected papers presented on the Eleventh ...
Economic interactions such as selling an item for profit or scheduling the time of a subcontractor f...
Organizations and researchers always ask: How can we increase the profits of a company? Is there a w...
By designing remuneration schemes based on a bonus rewarding specific firm-level outcomes, the owner...
Our primary objective in this paper is to analyse the utility of incentive mechanism in the workplac...
This paper challenges the results of the “classical” managerial delegation literature, where it is a...
We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates ...
This dissertation studies three mechanisms of managerial disciplining and incentive alignment propos...
We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates ...
Modern corporate governance codes include clauses requiring the disclosure of managerial compensatio...
This dissertation consists of three essays on the public goods game. Each essay is an experimental e...
Contributions to game theory and management, vol. X. Collected papers presented on the Tenth Interna...
This article revisits the managerial delegation literature led by Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Jud...
We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates ...
This paper analyses the effects of managerial delegation on the equilibrium outcomes in a duopoly ma...
In Contributions to game theory and management, vol. XI. Collected papers presented on the Eleventh ...
Economic interactions such as selling an item for profit or scheduling the time of a subcontractor f...