We pit non-incentivized introspection against five revealed preference mechanisms (“truth serums”) in the elicitation of beliefs in a simple two-player game. We measure the additivity, the predictive power for own behaviour, and the accuracy of each method. Beliefs from incentivized methods are better predictors of participants’ own behaviour compared to introspection. However, introspection performs equally well as the truth serums in terms of accuracy and additivity. We also find that correction for risk aversion improves the additivity of scoring-rule belief reports
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/bandeau-haut/documents-...
Using data on one-shot games, we investigate the assumption that players respond to underlying expec...
Abstract. After playing the Chicken game, players report their beliefs about their op-ponents strate...
We pit non-incentivised introspection against five revealed preference mechanisms (‘truth serums’) i...
In survey studies, probabilistic expectations about uncertain events are typically elicited by askin...
Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally...
Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally...
Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally...
Since they have been increasingly used in economics, elicitation rules for subjective beliefs are un...
If asking subjects their beliefs during repeated game play changes the way those subjects play, usin...
We conduct a laboratory experiment with a constant-sum sender-receiver game and a sequential game of...
This paper studies the impact of belief elicitation on informational efficiency and individual behav...
Using data on one-shot games, we investigate whether players' actions can be viewed as responses to ...
This paper studies the impact of belief elicitation on informational efficiency and individual behav...
Using data on one-shot games, we investigate whether players ’ actions can be viewed as responses to...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/bandeau-haut/documents-...
Using data on one-shot games, we investigate the assumption that players respond to underlying expec...
Abstract. After playing the Chicken game, players report their beliefs about their op-ponents strate...
We pit non-incentivised introspection against five revealed preference mechanisms (‘truth serums’) i...
In survey studies, probabilistic expectations about uncertain events are typically elicited by askin...
Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally...
Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally...
Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally...
Since they have been increasingly used in economics, elicitation rules for subjective beliefs are un...
If asking subjects their beliefs during repeated game play changes the way those subjects play, usin...
We conduct a laboratory experiment with a constant-sum sender-receiver game and a sequential game of...
This paper studies the impact of belief elicitation on informational efficiency and individual behav...
Using data on one-shot games, we investigate whether players' actions can be viewed as responses to ...
This paper studies the impact of belief elicitation on informational efficiency and individual behav...
Using data on one-shot games, we investigate whether players ’ actions can be viewed as responses to...
URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/bandeau-haut/documents-...
Using data on one-shot games, we investigate the assumption that players respond to underlying expec...
Abstract. After playing the Chicken game, players report their beliefs about their op-ponents strate...