Add to ORKGMoran's conception of self-knowledge, in his book Authority and Estrangement, is connected to an extremely rationalistic conception of intentional action. I will argue that this rationalistic commitment can be avoided without renouncing the most basic aspects in his account of self-knowledge
This thesis defends an unusual view within the philosophy of intention: that there are reasons for i...
In my dissertation I show that we cannot conceive of ourselves as embodied beings unless we know som...
I deliver an account of ‘practical knowledge’; the knowledge we have of our own intentional actions....
In my opinion, Richard Moran’s account of the connections between self-knowledge and intentional act...
Exploring the idea of a more practical relationship between the agent and his own mental life leaves...
According to Anscombe, acting intentionally entails knowledge in ac- tion. This thesis has been near...
How does one know one's own beliefs, intentions, and other attitudes? Many responses to this questio...
In Authority and Estrangement Richard Moran takes some rather illuminating steps towards getting rid...
We think less than we think. My thesis moves from this suspicion to show that standard accounts of i...
Self-knowledge is not just another epistemic acquisition, like knowledge of trains or stamps. It is ...
What is the relation between first person authority and knowledge of one’s own actions? On one view,...
We think less than we think. My thesis moves from this suspicion to show that standard accounts of ...
Is the will a capacity for knowledge? I argue that it is. More precisely, I argue that we possess a ...
This chapter presents Davidson’s account of intentional action and intention. Davidson initially dis...
Why do your self-attributions of beliefs and intentions ordinarily constitute authoritative self-kno...
This thesis defends an unusual view within the philosophy of intention: that there are reasons for i...
In my dissertation I show that we cannot conceive of ourselves as embodied beings unless we know som...
I deliver an account of ‘practical knowledge’; the knowledge we have of our own intentional actions....
In my opinion, Richard Moran’s account of the connections between self-knowledge and intentional act...
Exploring the idea of a more practical relationship between the agent and his own mental life leaves...
According to Anscombe, acting intentionally entails knowledge in ac- tion. This thesis has been near...
How does one know one's own beliefs, intentions, and other attitudes? Many responses to this questio...
In Authority and Estrangement Richard Moran takes some rather illuminating steps towards getting rid...
We think less than we think. My thesis moves from this suspicion to show that standard accounts of i...
Self-knowledge is not just another epistemic acquisition, like knowledge of trains or stamps. It is ...
What is the relation between first person authority and knowledge of one’s own actions? On one view,...
We think less than we think. My thesis moves from this suspicion to show that standard accounts of ...
Is the will a capacity for knowledge? I argue that it is. More precisely, I argue that we possess a ...
This chapter presents Davidson’s account of intentional action and intention. Davidson initially dis...
Why do your self-attributions of beliefs and intentions ordinarily constitute authoritative self-kno...
This thesis defends an unusual view within the philosophy of intention: that there are reasons for i...
In my dissertation I show that we cannot conceive of ourselves as embodied beings unless we know som...
I deliver an account of ‘practical knowledge’; the knowledge we have of our own intentional actions....