An Executive-Power Non-Delegation Doctrine for the Private Administration of Federal Law

Private entities often administer federal law. The early-twentieth-century Supreme Court derived constitutional limits to delegations of administrative power to private entities, grounding them in Article I of the Constitution where legislative power is delegated and in the Due Process Clause where the delegee\u27s bias is apparent. But limits to the delegation of executive power to private administrators of law might exist in Article II. Those limits- in particular, their scope and the interplay among them-have been left underdeveloped by existing scholarship. This Article explores the possibility of an Article II executive-power non-delegation doctrine for the private administration of federal law, and develops one potential framework for its analysis. Drawing force from the Vesting Clause, and informed primarily by the Take Care and Appointments Clauses, the doctrine might involve two inquiries: (1) Does the delegated task implicate [t]he executive Power that the Constitution vests in the President-a power, in the words of the Take Care Clause, to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed ? (2) If so, is the delegee a proper subordinate to the President, so that his performance of such executive tasks does not divest the President of [tihe executive Power ? As the Article explains, a rigid unitary executive approach- which demands complete presidential control over every task connected with the execution of law-is not the only coherent way to understand Article II\u27s Vesting Clause to restrict delegations of executive power. Under the Supreme Court\u27s Article IIprecedent, the doctrine\u27s inquiries might depend instead on the nature of the task and the form, degree, and directness of presidential oversight or control vailable over the task or over the one performing it, flexibly allowing for certain trade-offs among those control mechanisms, so long as the President remains accountable for the execution of law. By conceptualizing Article II as imposing a non-delegation analysis, this Article observes how the Vesting Clause might constrain certain delegations of power over law\u27s execution that are made by the President and executive branch, not simply those made by Congress