Integrated game theoretic and network integrity scheme to detect and mitigate insider threats in MANETs and colluding jamming attack

This dissertation present an accumulative feedback adaptation transmission rate scheme (AFAT) that ensures MANET nodes will be able to maximize the transmission rates to ensure applications’ bandwidth requirements are met. AFAT adopts a decentralized approach which involves communication of transmission rates between neighboring nodes. The knowledge of neighbor nodes’ transmission rates allows an individual node to adjust the rates accordingly. AFAT is scalable because the overhead only involves exchange of transmission rates between neighboring nodes. Simulation results confirm that MANET nodes adopting the AFAT scheme will converge to a transmission rate that will meet applications’ bandwidth requirements. This dissertation propose a novel reputation-based coalition game in MANETs to detect and mitigate insider jamming attacks. Since there is no centralized controller in MANETs, the nodes rely heavily on availability of transmission rates and a reputation for each individual node to detect the presence of internal jamming node. Nodes will form a stable grand coalition in order to make a strategic security defense decision, maintain the grand coalition based on node reputation, and exclude any malicious node based on reputation value. Simulation results show that our approach provides a framework to quantify information needed by adversaries to launch insider attacks. The proposed approach will improve MANET’s defense against insider attacks, while also reducing incorrect classification of legitimate nodes as jammers. Finally we focus on collaborative smart jamming attacks, where the attackers who have been detected as insider jammers in a MANET, return to attack the MANET based on the knowledge learned. In the collaborative smart jamming attack, two or more smart jammers will form a coalition to attack the coalitions in the MANET. The smart jammers were detected and then excluded from their initial coalition, they then regrouped to start their own coalition and share previously gained knowledge about legitimate nodes in their erstwhile coalition with the aim of achieving a highly coordinated successful jamming attack on the legitimate coalition. The success of the attack largely depends on the insider jammer\u27s collective knowledge. We present a technique to appropriately represent knowledge gathered by insider jammers which would lead to a successful attack