The vulnerable and solidarity condition of human life: a critical analysis of MacIntyre’s thinking

En este artículo se analiza la tesis de MacIntyre que sostiene la dimensión biológica o animal del ser humano, como la condición privilegiada mediante la cual puede reconocerse el carácter vulnerable y dependiente de los agentes morales. Este punto de partida permite argumentar a favor de las virtudes relacionadas con la reciprocidad, y cuestionar la idea del ser humano como un individuo solitario, sin ataduras afectivas y morales. Veremos que este planteamiento presenta algunas dificultades que serán examinadas al final del texto, y que su posición, aunque valiosa, no puede tener prioridad frente a la concepción moderna del individuo.We analyze in this article the thesis of MacIntyre which supports the biological or animal dimension of the human being, as the privileged condition by which the vulnerable and dependent character of the moral agents can be recognized. This starting point allows to argue in favor of the virtues related to the reciprocity and to question the idea of the human being like a solitary individual, without affective and moral ties. We will see that this approach presents some difficulties that will be examined at the end of the text and that its position, although valuable, can not have priority over the modern conception of the individual