Old Myths and New Realities (I)

-12- suspect that the explanation lies in that attitude of crusading anticommunism which has colored so much of American foreign policy over the years. The charm of the right-wing dictators has been their staunch anticommunism, and that appears to have been enough to compensate for such trivial defects as their despotism and corruption. I recall a member of the Senate, not so long ago, going so far as to defend the Greek colonels as democratic on the ground that they were resisting communism. This is not the hard-headed de facto-ism favored by the old school diplomats. It is ideological obsession on the part of old school cold warriors. I am not against tolerating these right-wing dictators any more than I am against tolerating communist regimes. But our attitude over the last twenty-five years has not been one of toleration: it has been one of intolerance of communist regimes giving rise to excessive friendliness toward right-wing regimes. The inspiration for such an outlook comes not from the practical Metternich but from John Calvin, or from the religious crusades. To return to my theme: If devotion to Thieu and Ky are the obstacle to a compromise political settlement, the asset we have is our remaining force of over 400,000 men in Vietnam -- and our freedom to take them out. The Communists want them out, and it is supremely in our interests to get them out. That would seem a promising basis for doing business. I do not share President Nixon's belief that our choice is between Vietnamization and "precipitate withdrawal." Vietnamization is only the latest in a series of military strategies, and as General Ridgway, former United Nations commander in Korea and Army Chief of Staff, recently asserted, a military solution "is not now and never has been possible under conditions consistent with our interests." (6) The real choice, as Arthur Cox suggests, is between political settlement now and "defeat and humiliation" later