Economic Interdependence and Security Strategy : The International Political Economy and East-West Trade in the Cold War

The purpose of this article is to analyze several concepts concerning economic interdependence and the security of nations in the IPE (International Political Economy), and to apply the concepts to the case of economic sanctions used by the United States and the EC toward the Soviet Union during the "new cold war". It deals with unsolved arguments between liberalism and realism in the IPE. Liberals argue that economic interdependence lowers the likelihood of war by increasing the value of trading over the alternative of aggression : interdependent states would rather trade than invade. Realists dismiss the liberal argument, arguing that high interdependence increases rather than decreases the probability of war. In anarchy, states must constantly worry about their security. Accordingly, interdependence gives states an incentive to initiate war, if only to ensure continued access to necessary materials and goods. This paper argues that the realist's assertion is based on old notions influenced by mercantilism and imperialism. This article, then, deals with East-West trade during the "new cold war" and asserts that the EC has employed "positive economic linkage", involving the use of positive economic means in the pursuit of political goals.departmental bulletin pape