We incorporate managerial risk aversion and stochasticity of takeover synergy gains into Harris’ (Harris, E.G. 1990. Antitakeover measures, golden parachutes, and target firm shareholder welfare. Rand Journal of Economics 21, no. 4 : 614–25.) bargaining model for the coexistence of antitakeover defenses and golden parachutes in corporate charters.We show that: (i) it is not always optimal that the target-firm shareholders adopt antitakeover defenses, (ii) the size of the golden parachute is proportional to the riskiness of the synergistic gains, and (iii) the target-firm shareholders are unequivocally better-off with golden parachutes than takeover-contingent stock options
This paper highlights the role of takeover defenses in the acquisition process. If managerial defens...
This paper studies optimal managerial contracts applying both complete and incomplete contracting ap...
Golden parachutes have attracted substantial attention from investors and public officials for more ...
Takeover defenses, golden parachutes, and bargaining over stochastic synergy gains: a note on optima...
Two models that attempt to explain the adoption of golden parachutes are examined. The first model v...
We examine the shareholder wealth effects of takeover defenses by developing a model in which takeov...
In this paper we test for the motives for adopting golden parachutes and Anti Takeover Amendments (A...
Although a large number of U.S. firms are protected by takeover defenses, such as staggered boards a...
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of golden parachutes on shareholders\u...
Golden parachutes are a new and controversial management perquisite that allow covered managers to v...
The rationale for issuing poison pill securities remains unclear, despite the findings of a large bo...
In this paper we test for the motives for adopting golden parachutes and Anti-Takeover Amendments (A...
This paper analyzes the market for corporate control and acquisitions by explicitly modeling a typic...
External agents are frequently characterized as necessary for efficiency in team production settings...
The appropriate division of authority between a company’s board and its shareholders has been the ce...
This paper highlights the role of takeover defenses in the acquisition process. If managerial defens...
This paper studies optimal managerial contracts applying both complete and incomplete contracting ap...
Golden parachutes have attracted substantial attention from investors and public officials for more ...
Takeover defenses, golden parachutes, and bargaining over stochastic synergy gains: a note on optima...
Two models that attempt to explain the adoption of golden parachutes are examined. The first model v...
We examine the shareholder wealth effects of takeover defenses by developing a model in which takeov...
In this paper we test for the motives for adopting golden parachutes and Anti Takeover Amendments (A...
Although a large number of U.S. firms are protected by takeover defenses, such as staggered boards a...
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of golden parachutes on shareholders\u...
Golden parachutes are a new and controversial management perquisite that allow covered managers to v...
The rationale for issuing poison pill securities remains unclear, despite the findings of a large bo...
In this paper we test for the motives for adopting golden parachutes and Anti-Takeover Amendments (A...
This paper analyzes the market for corporate control and acquisitions by explicitly modeling a typic...
External agents are frequently characterized as necessary for efficiency in team production settings...
The appropriate division of authority between a company’s board and its shareholders has been the ce...
This paper highlights the role of takeover defenses in the acquisition process. If managerial defens...
This paper studies optimal managerial contracts applying both complete and incomplete contracting ap...
Golden parachutes have attracted substantial attention from investors and public officials for more ...