The impact of crop insurance on changes in input use has attracted much attention by economists. While there are a number of studies on this topic, they frame moral hazard in inputs use in a static model. However, when agricultural producers are forward-looking, they would make input allocation decisions realizing that their decisions would affect their future actual production history. This, in turn, affects the probability and size of future indemnity payments. Thus, moral hazard should be framed in a dynamic input use decision model. We first show theoretically that under certain feasible conditions, a static analysis always results in lower optimal input use when compared to a dynamic one with endogenous actual production history. This ...
This paper examines the factors influencing farmer participation in crop insurance schemes, but unli...
The question of how insurance programs affect agricultural input use is commanding increasing attent...
This paper examines whether the loadings on the crop insurance premium rates for risks such as moral...
The impact of crop insurance on changes in input use has attracted much attention by economists. Whi...
The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation provides one of the most widely adopted risk mitigation tools...
Emerging precision agriculture technologies allow farms to make input decisions with greater informa...
In this paper we develop a theoretical model of input supply by agricultural producers who purchase ...
By altering the probability distribution of farm income, crop insurance programs affect farmer's inp...
The main motivation for this paper is the recognition of the fact that asymmetric information is the...
Empirical evidence for the existence of moral hazard in the U.S. crop insurance program has been inc...
This paper employs a cost function analysis method to investigate the existence of moral hazard in c...
[[abstract]]In this paper, we seek empirical evidence of moral hazard in the U.S. crop insurance pro...
Using farm level data and a simultaneous probit model we evaluate the input use and environmental ef...
Federal crop insurance programs have a prevented planting provision that can protect producers from ...
The asymmetric information problems of adverse selection and moral hazardcan cause insurance markets...
This paper examines the factors influencing farmer participation in crop insurance schemes, but unli...
The question of how insurance programs affect agricultural input use is commanding increasing attent...
This paper examines whether the loadings on the crop insurance premium rates for risks such as moral...
The impact of crop insurance on changes in input use has attracted much attention by economists. Whi...
The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation provides one of the most widely adopted risk mitigation tools...
Emerging precision agriculture technologies allow farms to make input decisions with greater informa...
In this paper we develop a theoretical model of input supply by agricultural producers who purchase ...
By altering the probability distribution of farm income, crop insurance programs affect farmer's inp...
The main motivation for this paper is the recognition of the fact that asymmetric information is the...
Empirical evidence for the existence of moral hazard in the U.S. crop insurance program has been inc...
This paper employs a cost function analysis method to investigate the existence of moral hazard in c...
[[abstract]]In this paper, we seek empirical evidence of moral hazard in the U.S. crop insurance pro...
Using farm level data and a simultaneous probit model we evaluate the input use and environmental ef...
Federal crop insurance programs have a prevented planting provision that can protect producers from ...
The asymmetric information problems of adverse selection and moral hazardcan cause insurance markets...
This paper examines the factors influencing farmer participation in crop insurance schemes, but unli...
The question of how insurance programs affect agricultural input use is commanding increasing attent...
This paper examines whether the loadings on the crop insurance premium rates for risks such as moral...