Add to ORKGThis Article seeks to describe the dynamics of interaction between federal prosecutors and federal enforcement agents, and to suggest how these dynamics affect the exercise of enforcement discretion. After considering the virtues and pitfalls of both hierarchical and coordinate organizational modes, the Article offers a normative model that views prosecutors and agents as members of a working group, with each side monitoring the other. It concludes by exploring how this model can be furthered or frustrated with various procedural and structural changes
This paper considers a model of enforcement with corruptible supervisor in an agency framework. We e...
Prosecutors are one of the most powerful actors in the American criminal justice system, yet there i...
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Review ...
This Article seeks to describe the dynamics of interaction between federal prosecutors and federal e...
This is an effort to describe the dynamics of interaction between federal prosecutors and federal en...
No government official has as much unreviewable power or discretion as the prosecutor. Few regulatio...
Parallel civil and criminal enforcement dominates public enforcement of everything from securities r...
On a daily basis, prosecutors decide whether and how to charge individuals for alleged criminal cond...
This Article discusses the undefined responsibilities of federal prosecutors. For purposes of exampl...
Administrative agencies are an increasingly prominent feature of the legal system. This article pres...
The key to the growing prominence of prosecutors, both in the United States and elsewhere, lies in t...
This paper considers a model of enforcement with corruptible enforcers in a principal-supervisor-age...
Although courts have traditionally relied primarily on prosecutors’ individual self-restraint and in...
Generally, treatments of prosecutorial discretion in the sentencing context tend to focus on its cha...
This paper explores law enforcement in a federal system to address the reality that the level of det...
This paper considers a model of enforcement with corruptible supervisor in an agency framework. We e...
Prosecutors are one of the most powerful actors in the American criminal justice system, yet there i...
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Review ...
This Article seeks to describe the dynamics of interaction between federal prosecutors and federal e...
This is an effort to describe the dynamics of interaction between federal prosecutors and federal en...
No government official has as much unreviewable power or discretion as the prosecutor. Few regulatio...
Parallel civil and criminal enforcement dominates public enforcement of everything from securities r...
On a daily basis, prosecutors decide whether and how to charge individuals for alleged criminal cond...
This Article discusses the undefined responsibilities of federal prosecutors. For purposes of exampl...
Administrative agencies are an increasingly prominent feature of the legal system. This article pres...
The key to the growing prominence of prosecutors, both in the United States and elsewhere, lies in t...
This paper considers a model of enforcement with corruptible enforcers in a principal-supervisor-age...
Although courts have traditionally relied primarily on prosecutors’ individual self-restraint and in...
Generally, treatments of prosecutorial discretion in the sentencing context tend to focus on its cha...
This paper explores law enforcement in a federal system to address the reality that the level of det...
This paper considers a model of enforcement with corruptible supervisor in an agency framework. We e...
Prosecutors are one of the most powerful actors in the American criminal justice system, yet there i...
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Review ...