Add to ORKGWe characterize an optimal financial contract when the firm’s realized cashflow isunobservable to the investor and the firm’s collateral can only be liquidated partiallyby resorting to the services of a costly third party. An optimal contract may exhibita piecewise structure and vary with the liquidation cost and the firm’s actual liquidityshortage. Partial liquidation and wholesale transfers of collateral can coexist in anoptimal contract. In contrast to part of the literature, the incentive-compatibilityconstraint incorporates the firm’s limited liability, and may be slack at the optimum.Allowing the firm to overcome an ex-post liquidity shortage by borrowing surreptitiouslyfrom a third party may reduce the firm’s ...
In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress....
This paper integrates the problem of designing corporate bank-ruptcy rules into a theory of optimal ...
This paper analyzes optimal financial contracts for an incumbent and potential entrant accounting fo...
We characterize an optimal financial contract when the firm’s realized cashflow isunobservable to th...
We study theoretically the possibility for the parties to efficiently resolve financial distress by ...
In a multiple-good risk-sharing environment with ex post private information, conditions are found u...
This version: October 2007We study theoretically the possibility for the parties to efficiently reso...
In a simple risk-sharing environment with ex post private information, conditions are found under wh...
A popular view of limited liability in financial contracting is that it is the result of societal pr...
We consider a moral hazard setup wherein leveraged firms have incentives to take on excessive risks ...
This paper employs mechanism design to study the effects of imperfect legal enforcement on optimal s...
We study theoretically the possibility for the parties to efficiently resolve financial distress by ...
We consider a moral hazard setup wherein leveraged firms have incentives to take on excessive risks ...
In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress....
The existence of collateral requirements to guarantee repayment on issued securities reduces in gene...
In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress....
This paper integrates the problem of designing corporate bank-ruptcy rules into a theory of optimal ...
This paper analyzes optimal financial contracts for an incumbent and potential entrant accounting fo...
We characterize an optimal financial contract when the firm’s realized cashflow isunobservable to th...
We study theoretically the possibility for the parties to efficiently resolve financial distress by ...
In a multiple-good risk-sharing environment with ex post private information, conditions are found u...
This version: October 2007We study theoretically the possibility for the parties to efficiently reso...
In a simple risk-sharing environment with ex post private information, conditions are found under wh...
A popular view of limited liability in financial contracting is that it is the result of societal pr...
We consider a moral hazard setup wherein leveraged firms have incentives to take on excessive risks ...
This paper employs mechanism design to study the effects of imperfect legal enforcement on optimal s...
We study theoretically the possibility for the parties to efficiently resolve financial distress by ...
We consider a moral hazard setup wherein leveraged firms have incentives to take on excessive risks ...
In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress....
The existence of collateral requirements to guarantee repayment on issued securities reduces in gene...
In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress....
This paper integrates the problem of designing corporate bank-ruptcy rules into a theory of optimal ...
This paper analyzes optimal financial contracts for an incumbent and potential entrant accounting fo...