Ethical brain : should we be concerned about the naturalization of ethics?

We are witnessing a new situation: thanks to new empiric methods contemporary science enter the sphere that formerly used to be the subject of philosophical refl ection. This situation refers also to ethical questions. Research, particularly that relating to neurobiological and cognitive foundations suggest signifi cant changes in our perception of a human being while many researchers and theorists predict revolutionary changes to follow. This means that the old disputes become current anew, although in a different context: on one hand - in the light of unquestionable successes of neurobiology and other sciences, there is an increasing number of supporters of the naturalization concept whereas on the other hand - there are growing concerns about the “naturalized” view on the human and the world. In my paper, I would like to address two major questions. The first one refers to the results of contemporary research carried out within the framework of broadly construed neuroscience which may affect the functioning of a human in the sphere of ethics. The other question is whether one really should be concerned about the naturalization of ethics (whereby it greatly depends on how the “naturalization” is understood). Either way, there is much evidence in support of the view that Dostoyevsky was wrong stating that if God does not exist (or, specifically: the immortal soul, volitional “I”, etc.), everything is permitted. Due to their importance, these questions will require broader, possibly interdisciplinary discussion and refraining from simplified conclusions that are often a result of ignorance