How regimes shape preferences : A study of political actors' labour market policy preferences in flexicurity and dualizing countries

Political actors do not operate in a vacuum; rather, it is safe to assume that their preferences are influenced by the institutional context in which they operate. By means of novel interview data, which was collected in flexicurity countries, i.e. Denmark and Switzerland, and in dualizing countries, i.e. France, Germany and Italy, I investigate the preferences of parties, unions, state bodies, employers and social movement organizations towards traditional and activation strategies. I find that the institutional context indeed shapes preferences. The results reveal, for instance, that state bodies reject increasing activation efforts in flexicurity countries but support it in dualizing countries. Moreover, in line with previous research, social democratic parties are found to cater to the interests of insiders by endorsing the expansion of traditional measures in dualizing countries, while focusing on outsiders’ interests by preferring the expansion of activation in flexicurity countries