We consider vertical differentiation with quality uncertainty and information disparities, in a duopoly where products have credence attributes and a minimum quality standard exists.Optimistic misperceptions further relax price competition but uninformed consumers may be cheated in equilibrium due to minimum product differentiation when informed consumers buy low quality goods. Optimistic misperceptions turn out to be an incentive for product differentiation when informed consumers buy high quality goods, even if the real quality differential is always lower than expected by uninformed consumers.Increasing the share of informed consumers may counterbalance the effect of optimism on equilibrium prices but in the meantime reduce the incentive...
In markets where product quality is important, more than one characteristic is usually necessary for...
This paper considers a market in which only the incumbent’s quality is publicly known. The entrant’s...
We analyze vertical product differentiation in a model where a good’s quality is unobservable to buy...
We consider vertical differentiation with quality uncertainty and information disparities, in a duop...
We have considered a duopoly with perceived vertical differentiation, information disparity and opti...
In this paper, we extend the model of vertical product differentiation to consider information dispa...
I present the idea that imperfect information about the (vertical) quality characteristics of goods ...
When choosing between two goods, consumers anticipate the utility they expect to derive from each pr...
This paper analyses price competition under product differentiation when goods are defined in a two ...
This paper examines the effects of uncertainty and the choice of financial structure in a vertically...
In the classical literature on vertical differentiation, goods are assumed to be single products eac...
A duopoly model is developed in which firms' strategic variables include brand quality, the number o...
We revisit the choice of product differentiation in theHotellingmodel, by assuming that competing fi...
This paper considers a monopolist that conducts vertical product differentiation. Previous analyses ...
In three identical laboratory markets, sellers possess products whose quality is both exogenously an...
In markets where product quality is important, more than one characteristic is usually necessary for...
This paper considers a market in which only the incumbent’s quality is publicly known. The entrant’s...
We analyze vertical product differentiation in a model where a good’s quality is unobservable to buy...
We consider vertical differentiation with quality uncertainty and information disparities, in a duop...
We have considered a duopoly with perceived vertical differentiation, information disparity and opti...
In this paper, we extend the model of vertical product differentiation to consider information dispa...
I present the idea that imperfect information about the (vertical) quality characteristics of goods ...
When choosing between two goods, consumers anticipate the utility they expect to derive from each pr...
This paper analyses price competition under product differentiation when goods are defined in a two ...
This paper examines the effects of uncertainty and the choice of financial structure in a vertically...
In the classical literature on vertical differentiation, goods are assumed to be single products eac...
A duopoly model is developed in which firms' strategic variables include brand quality, the number o...
We revisit the choice of product differentiation in theHotellingmodel, by assuming that competing fi...
This paper considers a monopolist that conducts vertical product differentiation. Previous analyses ...
In three identical laboratory markets, sellers possess products whose quality is both exogenously an...
In markets where product quality is important, more than one characteristic is usually necessary for...
This paper considers a market in which only the incumbent’s quality is publicly known. The entrant’s...
We analyze vertical product differentiation in a model where a good’s quality is unobservable to buy...