The Resurgence of Nationalism in Time of Crisis

In time of crisis nationalism emerges as a strong cohesive factor of social groups. This trend has been experimented in Europe repeatedly during the 20th century and, once again, in the new millennium, when a new crisis has been deeply affecting the world, financially and economically, since 2008. The mechanism is very simple and to a large extent unsophisticated. Basically, the homogeneity of a social/cultural group (in modern times the “nation”, whatever this word may mean) is claimed as a pivotal factor able to guarantee the best conditions for resisting the adversities, affording the uncertainties of the changes imposed by the crisis, and re-establishing the pre-existing social stability and wealth. Actually, this process is based on a great political (and cultural) illusion, since there are no old answers to new problems, and no return to the pre-crisis social stability/wealth under the old conditions. However, this illusion does work: it speaks to emotions, and policy makers basically refer to it in order to preserve power, mobilize consensus and the support of people, which are (emotionally) inclined to positively react to such suggestions. In other words, nationalism seems a powerful shield of the group, since it is perceived as an effective tool able to guarantee the collective sense of belonging, when identities are challenged by the changing times. Mostly, the implementation of this process is pursued through the imposition of hierarchical (patriarchal) homogeneities within the group and the harsh definition of the boundaries of inclusiveness. In doing so, however, nationalism becomes a vehicle of exclusiveness, where gender-male predominance, racism, and xenophobia are nurtured. Therefore, it reinforces the identification of “otherness” as a social factor of group’s threat, by establishing the basis for confrontations, conflicts, and wars. This identification is particularly promoted by policy makers lacking a vision of the future, having no courage to pursue radical reforms, and/or believing they will be able to attract easily the consensus, while being simultaneously confident that they will maintain the control over the events. The Yugoslav experience in the 80s of the 20th century is, in this sense, indicative under many respects. In this framework, the chapter analysis its similarities and differences with the EU crisis since 2008 as well as the dynamics that make reconciliation among/within the Yugoslav successor states still an open issue