In an auction with costly participation, we show that bidder default may cause social welfare loss through (i) the possibility of no trade and (ii) the under participation of bidders in equilibrium. We also provide closed-form solutions to the model
Pervasive overbidding represents a well-documented feature of all-pay auctions. Aggregate bids excee...
A key prediction of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion in second-p...
We study the effects of corruption on equilibrium competition and social welfare in a public procure...
In an auction with costly participation, we show that bidder default may cause social welfare loss t...
This dissertation examines common value auctions in which bidder default is allowed. Contractual def...
After the close of an auction, the winning bidder may find that he is unable to carry out his bid of...
We examine a dynamic second-price auction with independent private values and sequential costly entr...
This dissertation consists of three chapters exploring the role that reference-dependentpreferences ...
In auctions where bidders are uncertain of their value and are fully liable for their bids, there ex...
This paper studies the degrees of equilibrium competition in three common forms of auctions with cos...
We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a contr...
We examine a dynamic second-price auction with independent private values and sequential costly entr...
We study endogenous-participation auctions where bidders only know the number of potential participa...
Potential bidders respond to a seller's choice of auction mechanism for a common-value or affiliated...
We show that the introduction of a reserve price may promote entry, increase social welfare, and als...
Pervasive overbidding represents a well-documented feature of all-pay auctions. Aggregate bids excee...
A key prediction of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion in second-p...
We study the effects of corruption on equilibrium competition and social welfare in a public procure...
In an auction with costly participation, we show that bidder default may cause social welfare loss t...
This dissertation examines common value auctions in which bidder default is allowed. Contractual def...
After the close of an auction, the winning bidder may find that he is unable to carry out his bid of...
We examine a dynamic second-price auction with independent private values and sequential costly entr...
This dissertation consists of three chapters exploring the role that reference-dependentpreferences ...
In auctions where bidders are uncertain of their value and are fully liable for their bids, there ex...
This paper studies the degrees of equilibrium competition in three common forms of auctions with cos...
We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a contr...
We examine a dynamic second-price auction with independent private values and sequential costly entr...
We study endogenous-participation auctions where bidders only know the number of potential participa...
Potential bidders respond to a seller's choice of auction mechanism for a common-value or affiliated...
We show that the introduction of a reserve price may promote entry, increase social welfare, and als...
Pervasive overbidding represents a well-documented feature of all-pay auctions. Aggregate bids excee...
A key prediction of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion in second-p...
We study the effects of corruption on equilibrium competition and social welfare in a public procure...
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