BELIEVING FAKE NEWS

The proliferation of misinformation, inaccuracy in data processing, twisted scientific findings through the web and social media, in a word the proliferation of “fake news” have raised worries concerning their alleged impact on democratic processes. In this paper, I want to tackle this phenomenon by raising two questions. The first concerns what fake news is, or, to put it differently, whether it is a specific form compared to traditional public disinformation and deception. The second question addresses the issue of fake news from the viewpoint of the recipient or consumer, and asks on the basis of which cognitive traps and mechanisms cognizers end up believing fake news at a higher and faster rate than true news. In the first section of the paper I shall thus take up the discussion on what fake news is and see whether a specific account can be provided that mark it specifically off compared to traditional forms of public deception. In the second section of the paper, I shall try to map the cognitive and motivational traps making people victims of this form of disinformation and deception. Finally, in the third section, I shall take up the discussion about possible remedies, focusing on the ones directed at improving individual epistemic responses to fake news exposure. More precisely, I shall try to connect the literature on new media communications and the studies on the cognitive and motivational distortions in belief formation and see whether some hints for counteracting the effect of fake news can be found