Add to ORKGThis paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and time profile of public spending. All voters agree that a balanced budget is ex ante optimaL However, if there is disagreement between current and future majorities, a balanced budget is not a political equilibrium under majority rule. Under certain conditions a majority of the voters favors a budget deficit, and the equilibrium deficit is larger the greater is the polarization among voters. (JEL 320,025
When governments are in a parliamentary minority they have to negotiate with opposition parties over...
This paper studies budget processes, both theoretically and experimentally. We give a sufficient con...
Using the method of optimal control, when an incumbent politician derives utility from voting suppor...
This paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and ...
This paper analyzes a model in which different rational individuals vote over the composition and ti...
Two major political problems that face every community are: (1) to determine how much money the loca...
This paper considers balanced-budget redistribution between socioeconomic groups of individuals as t...
In this paper, we consider if extreme policies in terms of more polarized budgets can occur under th...
While most Americans have long favored a balanced federal budget , not all do. This paper uses cross...
This paper studies majority voting outcomes for a specific class of two-dimensional policies. The il...
This paper contributes to the literature on majority voting over fiscal policies. We depart from the...
The article examines mechanisms governing public finance and budget deficits in democratic countries...
Unbalanced budgets have sparked decades of debate among legislators, scholars, and the public at lar...
Survey data reveals that government budgets tend to go into the red. Public Choice economists as wel...
This paper uses the political economy model of Battaglini and Coate (2008) to analyze the impact of ...
When governments are in a parliamentary minority they have to negotiate with opposition parties over...
This paper studies budget processes, both theoretically and experimentally. We give a sufficient con...
Using the method of optimal control, when an incumbent politician derives utility from voting suppor...
This paper analyzes a model in which a group of rational individuals votes over the composition and ...
This paper analyzes a model in which different rational individuals vote over the composition and ti...
Two major political problems that face every community are: (1) to determine how much money the loca...
This paper considers balanced-budget redistribution between socioeconomic groups of individuals as t...
In this paper, we consider if extreme policies in terms of more polarized budgets can occur under th...
While most Americans have long favored a balanced federal budget , not all do. This paper uses cross...
This paper studies majority voting outcomes for a specific class of two-dimensional policies. The il...
This paper contributes to the literature on majority voting over fiscal policies. We depart from the...
The article examines mechanisms governing public finance and budget deficits in democratic countries...
Unbalanced budgets have sparked decades of debate among legislators, scholars, and the public at lar...
Survey data reveals that government budgets tend to go into the red. Public Choice economists as wel...
This paper uses the political economy model of Battaglini and Coate (2008) to analyze the impact of ...
When governments are in a parliamentary minority they have to negotiate with opposition parties over...
This paper studies budget processes, both theoretically and experimentally. We give a sufficient con...
Using the method of optimal control, when an incumbent politician derives utility from voting suppor...