With international externalities, different country sizes, imperfect competition, and trade costs, tax competition for mobile firms is efficiency-enhancing with respect to the free market outcome. Under both scenarios, the resulting inefficiencies in international specialization and trade flows vanish when trade costs are low enough. Otherwise, only international tax coordination can implement the efficient spatial distribution of firms. © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved
Larger firms are more likely to use tax haven operations to exploit international tax differences. W...
We develop a model of capital tax competition in which imperfectly competitive firms choose both the...
If countries anticipate international Bertrand competition in tax rates, they may expend effort that...
In this Paper, we show that with international externalities, different country sizes, imperfect com...
With international externalities, di¤erent country sizes, imper-fect competition, and trade costs, t...
While tax competition of mobile capital has been explored in the literature, little attention has be...
We propose a stylized model of international tax competition between a large coun-try and a tax have...
We analyse tax competition between two countries of unequal size trying to attract a foreign-owned m...
Cet article a fait l'objet d'un WP SMART-LERECO n°10-06, voir lienThe EU policy against harmful tax ...
peer reviewedMany authors demonstrate that the tax gap resulting from tax competition increases with...
We set up a simple two-country model of tax competition where firms with different productivity deci...
We analyse tax competition when a multinational firm has invested in two countries but also has an o...
We are grateful to Giancarlo Corsetti, Omar Licandro and Morten Ravn for constant advice. We would a...
International audienceTrade integration and the increasing mobility of firms have raised the need fo...
Abstract: This paper models tax competition for mobile firms that are differentiated by the amount o...
Larger firms are more likely to use tax haven operations to exploit international tax differences. W...
We develop a model of capital tax competition in which imperfectly competitive firms choose both the...
If countries anticipate international Bertrand competition in tax rates, they may expend effort that...
In this Paper, we show that with international externalities, different country sizes, imperfect com...
With international externalities, di¤erent country sizes, imper-fect competition, and trade costs, t...
While tax competition of mobile capital has been explored in the literature, little attention has be...
We propose a stylized model of international tax competition between a large coun-try and a tax have...
We analyse tax competition between two countries of unequal size trying to attract a foreign-owned m...
Cet article a fait l'objet d'un WP SMART-LERECO n°10-06, voir lienThe EU policy against harmful tax ...
peer reviewedMany authors demonstrate that the tax gap resulting from tax competition increases with...
We set up a simple two-country model of tax competition where firms with different productivity deci...
We analyse tax competition when a multinational firm has invested in two countries but also has an o...
We are grateful to Giancarlo Corsetti, Omar Licandro and Morten Ravn for constant advice. We would a...
International audienceTrade integration and the increasing mobility of firms have raised the need fo...
Abstract: This paper models tax competition for mobile firms that are differentiated by the amount o...
Larger firms are more likely to use tax haven operations to exploit international tax differences. W...
We develop a model of capital tax competition in which imperfectly competitive firms choose both the...
If countries anticipate international Bertrand competition in tax rates, they may expend effort that...
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