Add to ORKGIn this paper, we look at the effects of voter coordination on the equilibrium of voting games. Specifically, we analyze voter coordination through the concepts of strong equilibrium and coalition–proof equilibrium for plurality rule and runoff rule elections. We completely characterize these equilibria in the 3 candidate case, and provide results for important special cases in the general multicandidate case
We study stochastic voting models where the candidates are allowed to have any smooth, strictly incr...
In this note we show that, for generic plurality games (i.e., voting games under plurality rule), an...
We investigate whether the plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in large elections with...
Trembling hand (TH) equilibria were introduced by Selten in 1975. Intuitively, these are Nash equili...
We study how voting rules shape voter coordination in large three-candidate elections. We consider t...
Voting is widely used to aggregate the different preferences of agents, even though these agents are...
Series Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, Volume 285In a voting system, voters m...
The majority runoff system is widely used around the world, yet our understanding of its properties ...
The majority runoff system is widely used around the world. Yet, our understanding of its properties...
We suggest a new model for strategic voting based on local dominance, where voters consider a set of...
This thesis consists of three papers. The first paper is about voluntary provision of public goods, ...
Abstract. We study a game-theoretic model for Plurality, one of the most well-studied and widely-use...
We study the formation of a ruling coalition in political environments. Each individual is endowed w...
I analyze symmetric majority rule voting equilibria when voters wish to elect the better candidate a...
In real-life elections, vote-counting is often imperfect. We analyze the consequences of such imperf...
We study stochastic voting models where the candidates are allowed to have any smooth, strictly incr...
In this note we show that, for generic plurality games (i.e., voting games under plurality rule), an...
We investigate whether the plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in large elections with...
Trembling hand (TH) equilibria were introduced by Selten in 1975. Intuitively, these are Nash equili...
We study how voting rules shape voter coordination in large three-candidate elections. We consider t...
Voting is widely used to aggregate the different preferences of agents, even though these agents are...
Series Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, Volume 285In a voting system, voters m...
The majority runoff system is widely used around the world, yet our understanding of its properties ...
The majority runoff system is widely used around the world. Yet, our understanding of its properties...
We suggest a new model for strategic voting based on local dominance, where voters consider a set of...
This thesis consists of three papers. The first paper is about voluntary provision of public goods, ...
Abstract. We study a game-theoretic model for Plurality, one of the most well-studied and widely-use...
We study the formation of a ruling coalition in political environments. Each individual is endowed w...
I analyze symmetric majority rule voting equilibria when voters wish to elect the better candidate a...
In real-life elections, vote-counting is often imperfect. We analyze the consequences of such imperf...
We study stochastic voting models where the candidates are allowed to have any smooth, strictly incr...
In this note we show that, for generic plurality games (i.e., voting games under plurality rule), an...
We investigate whether the plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in large elections with...