An externalist and fringe inspired cognitive architecture

Many biological agents are characterized by consciousness. Many researches in Robotics and AI to reconsider the possibility of modeling and implementing a conscious machine (Buttazzo 2001; Holland 2003; Holland 2004; Adami 2006; Chella and Manzotti 2007; Aleksander 2008; Aleksander, Awret et al. 2008; Buttazzo 2008; Chrisley 2008; Gamez 2008; Manzotti and Tagliasco 2008; Chella and Manzotti 2009; Gamez 2009). Artificial consciousness assumes that there is some aspect of cognition that has not yet been adequately addressed and that is indeed implemented in many biological agents. Such a huge chasm dividing biological intelligent and conscious agents from artificial ones – most notably in terms of autonomy, semantic capabilities, intentionality, self-motivations, resilience, and information integration. Currently there are strong doubts as to what be necessary for consciousness. Recently, it has been argued that consciousness does not require many of the skills that roboticists are trying to implement (Koch and Tononi 2008, p. 50). In this paper I will exploit a biologically inspired model of cognition based on two suggestions. On the one hand, I will consider an externalist, situated and em-bodied framework whereby the vehicles of cognition are spread as to comprehend the external world. Secondly, I will build upon James’ model of fringe which has seldom been used in shaping cognition (Mangan 1997; Mangan 2008). Both can shape in a novel way the need for to be open to an unknown environment. In such a way I will consider different kind of embodiment and situatedness and will attempt a comparison between biological agents, current cognitive architectures, and the suggested architecture