Two concepts of human dignity: comparative analysis of s. harris and r. spaemann

Two Concepts of Human Dignity: Comparative Analysis of S. Harris and R. Spaemann The Bachelor thesis is concerned with an international commitment to recognize and protect the inherent dignity of human person, which was affirmed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, therefore it might be considered as a principle which cause political implications. As ultimate question of this work is concerned with the justification of the principle of human dignity, analyzing what is the basis of this concept. As it is admitted, the concept of human dignity might be presented from several different philosophical perspectives. The first perspective is secular humanism, as a representative author was chosen S. Harris. According to S. Harris's notion when a human is perceived as an exclusively natural being, no human quality appears to be striking, unique and valuable by looking at him from the prism of evolution. Consequently, S. Harris theory does not reaffirm or declare a justification that can explain why human is perceived as dignified person, on what basis human life should be considered valuable, appreciated. The inadequacy of theoretical thinking allows formulate the problem of this work – that S. Harris conception of human being is insufficient to substantiate the dignity of a person, the inherent value of his being. In order to answer the question of the justification of the concept of human dignity, there must be chosen another perspective, which is connected with Christian anthropological viewpoint. R. Spaemann is known as one of the most influential philosophers concerned with the question of human dignity currently. According to him, dignity is not the object of the physical world. This concept has metaphysical origin. Dignity refers to human being as a person. The natural being, the individual, can not be perceived as a dignified entity, because dignity points to human being something of a much more fundamental, sacred, non-human origin. The author opposes an evolutionary anthropological interpretation, arguing that the only criterion of dignity must be the fact of being, but not the temporal, ephemeral quality or feature. In view of the formulated problem, the purpose of this paper is to answer the question of substantiation of human dignity by analyzing the concepts presented by S. Harris and R. Spaemann. In order to attain the aim of the work, the following tasks are performed: (i) presenting the concept of human being analyzed by the chosen authors, revealing their essential features, and (ii) discussing the concept of morality. In conclusion, a comparative analysis has revealed that S. Harris's interpretation is consistent with the evolutionary anthropological point of view, on the basis of which the individual's being and the characteristics that characterize him – rationality, consciousness, moral behavior – are the result of natural processes. In such a concept it is difficult to discover the criterion of dignity, as it is inconceivable to assign any stable and long-term attribute or feature to an individual. According to S. Harris, human dignity is embodied in the realization of the innate desire to create well-being. Meanwhile, R. Spaemann, without rejecting the metaphysical dimension, emphasizes that such an evolutionary interpretation is insufficient for human – as a totality – perceived. R. Spaemann introduces a metaphysical category of person, arguing that being a person is a natural fact of human existence. In this way, a person is one who has biological nature and metaphysical dimension of being. A person is considered to be unique, exclusive, one who has scientifically non-reducible subjectivity. As a human person one’s nature has something extraordinary – non-physical, non-human, sacred, unrestricted – it is person's contact with the Absolute, which is anchored in the conscience. The conscience is the element of divinity, which exists in every human being that justifies the idea of human dignity