CEO Compensation Structure, Dominance and R&D Expenditures

[[abstract]]本文從薪酬誘因與董事會監督機制兩個公司治理構面，探討高階主管薪酬結 構與支配能力，對企業裁減研發支出之短視行為的影響。實證結果發現，在自利的 動機下，高階主管會利用裁減研發支出方式，提高當期盈餘以增加其薪酬。而提高 高階主管股票基礎薪酬比率，會降低裁減研發支出的可能性，且在股票基礎導向的 薪酬結構下，透過股票基礎薪酬比率降低企業裁減研發支出的可能性，會高於現金 基礎導向的薪酬結構。此外高階主管具支配能力，所受監督的程度較低，出現裁減 研發支出的可能性較高，但是提高股票基礎薪酬比率，所降低裁減研發支出可能性 的效果，反而會較大。 From two aspects of corporate governance: namely compensation incentive and board monitoring mechanism, this paper aims to explore the impact of CEO compensation structure and dominance on R&D expenditure reduction. Empirical results indicate that myopic CEOs with their self-interest incentive tend to curtail R&D expenditure so as to increase the current earnings and their compensation. If their share-based compensation ratio increased, CEOs will be less likely to curtail R&D expenditures, this likelihood being higher than in cash-based compensation structure. In addition, the dominance power granted by CEOs with means they receive less monitoring, hence the higher likelihood of curtaining R&D expenditure, this likelihood becoming more prominent when the share-based compensation ratio is increased