An Economic Analysis of Bribery and Incomplete Environmental Enforcement

[[abstract]]In contrast with Mookherjee and Png (1995), we start with the basic model without an anticorruption agency to focus on the effect of bribery on environmental enforcement. The distortion by bribery can be eliminated without an anticorruption agency, as long as the wage incentive is fully provided. The major conclusions are as follows:(1) The government can reward part of penalties to the enforcer in order to increase enforcement efforts. (2) The firm gives bribes to decrease the enforcement efforts. However, in the existence of bribery, the enforcer will also increase enforcement efforts in order to gain more bribes. (3) Bribery is a transfer payment which can reduce distortions from enforcer's fixed salary.[[sponsorship]]中央研究院經濟研究所; 台灣水泥公司 The Institute of Economics,Academia Sinica; Taiwan Cement Company[[conferencetype]]國際[[conferencedate]]20001130~20001202[[booktype]]紙本[[iscallforpapers]]Y[[conferencelocation]]臺北市, 臺