[[abstract]]This paper develops a barbell model a la Hwang and Mai [Hwang, H., and C.C. Mai, 1990, Effects of spatial price discrimination on output, welfare, and location, American Economic Review 80, 567–575.] with homogeneous product and asymmetric demands to compare prices, aggregate profits and social welfare between Cournot and Bertrand competition, and to analyze the firms' equilibrium locations. It focuses on the impacts of the spatial barrier generated from transport costs, and the market size effect resulting from asymmetric demands. It shows that the market-size effect is crucial in determining firms' locations under Cournot competition, but insignificant under Bertrand competition. Moreover, the equilibrium price of the large ma...
In this paper, we consider oligopolistic competition in a spatial model when firms take care of good...
As social scientists have become increasingly aware of the welfare implications of firms' locations ...
Abstract: We study the competitive and welfare consequences when only one firm must commit to unifor...
In spatial competition models « à la Hotelling », we can treat simultaneously of two components of i...
If we take into account the spatial dimension of markets, prices of incumbent firms may be higher, a...
[[abstract]]Reinterpreting Hwang‐Mai (AER, 1990) by both simplifying and generalizing their analysis...
In this paper, I assume the existence of a distribution of urban amenities having its maximum at the...
This paper deals with the impact of the variation in the cost of transport upon the equilibrium of a...
[[abstract]]This paper provides a comprehensive comparison of the optimal location, output and welfa...
The conventional wisdom indicates that firms' optimal locations are sensitive to the modes of produc...
This paper investigates the properties of two types of cost restrictions that guarantee the existenc...
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 174-176)There has been great controversy in recent theor...
We present a general model of n firms with differentiated production costs competing in a linear mar...
We investigate the equilibrium location pattern and welfare implication in delivered pricing model (...
In a spatial competition model, changes in firms’ competitive behaviour may occur when the hypothesi...
In this paper, we consider oligopolistic competition in a spatial model when firms take care of good...
As social scientists have become increasingly aware of the welfare implications of firms' locations ...
Abstract: We study the competitive and welfare consequences when only one firm must commit to unifor...
In spatial competition models « à la Hotelling », we can treat simultaneously of two components of i...
If we take into account the spatial dimension of markets, prices of incumbent firms may be higher, a...
[[abstract]]Reinterpreting Hwang‐Mai (AER, 1990) by both simplifying and generalizing their analysis...
In this paper, I assume the existence of a distribution of urban amenities having its maximum at the...
This paper deals with the impact of the variation in the cost of transport upon the equilibrium of a...
[[abstract]]This paper provides a comprehensive comparison of the optimal location, output and welfa...
The conventional wisdom indicates that firms' optimal locations are sensitive to the modes of produc...
This paper investigates the properties of two types of cost restrictions that guarantee the existenc...
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 174-176)There has been great controversy in recent theor...
We present a general model of n firms with differentiated production costs competing in a linear mar...
We investigate the equilibrium location pattern and welfare implication in delivered pricing model (...
In a spatial competition model, changes in firms’ competitive behaviour may occur when the hypothesi...
In this paper, we consider oligopolistic competition in a spatial model when firms take care of good...
As social scientists have become increasingly aware of the welfare implications of firms' locations ...
Abstract: We study the competitive and welfare consequences when only one firm must commit to unifor...