[[alternative]]The Insurance Fraud Behavior of Repair House on Automobile Car Damage Insurance

計畫編號：NSC100-2410-H032-033 研究期間：20110801~20120731 研究經費：436,000[[abstract]]本文針對台灣的汽車維修廠，是否有在車體險上進行保險詐欺，進行研究。由於汽車維 修服務市場，是一個專業的市場，消費者可能因為專業知識不足、接受不必要維修服務， 因此，投保車體損失險的消費者，可能讓維修廠有進行誇大理賠金額之詐欺的空間。文 獻指出，當消費者搜尋維修服務要花費的時間成本愈大時，出現保險詐欺的可能愈高、 當契約自負額設計得愈高時，誇大金額的詐欺機率也愈高。由於，從維俢廠保險代理人 通路購買車體險的被保險人、相較於其他被保險人，搜尋維修服務的時間成本，相對較 高；因此，本研究擬透過檢證：是否來自維俢廠保險代理人通路的保單，自負額契約誘 發誇大之詐欺的行為也較強，來印證：汽車維修廠是否有針對車體險進行保險詐欺。[[abstract]]This research investigates that whether the repair house owned insurance agent conduct the fraud of build up in Taiwan’s Automobile car damage insurance market. the market of repair service is an expert market. The consumers could purchase excess unnecessary service because that they lack professional knowledge. And this is the reason why the insured leave a space for the repair house to defraud on the claim. In literature, higher searching time would induce higher probability of fraud. Higher deductible contract would induce higher probability of build-up. Because the searching time is relatively higher for those insured who has purchased insurance contract from the repair house owned agent, we try to test that whether the deductible induced build-up is stronger within these contracts. Hence, we can accordingly prove that whether there is build-up created by the repair house in Taiwan.[[sponsorship]]行政院國家科學委員